Introduction

The exploration of consciousness has long been a focal point in philosophy, psychology, and cognitive science. The intricate nature of subjective experience has spurred various theoretical frameworks to understand its components. This paper delves into the notion of core subjectivity, the fundamental base of mind that one experiences in the pure consciousness state, and examines its interconnected modes—awareness, phenomenality, and intentionality. Leveraging strong phenomenal intentionality theory’s claim that all intentional states are (or arise from) phenomenal states, we propose that the modes of core subjectivity constitute a unified identity akin to the concept of Being in Trinitarian philosophies and spiritual traditions. This exploration aims to shed light on the intricacies of consciousness, emphasizing the interdependence and coexistence of its fundamental dimensions.

In the subsequent sections, we will delve into the individual components of core subjectivity, highlighting their distinct yet inseparable roles in the constitution of consciousness. By employing a Trinitarian analogy, we seek to offer a novel perspective that transcends traditional dichotomies, presenting core subjectivity as an integrated whole with diverse modalities. Furthermore, we will use this framework of consciousness to explain some of the mind’s fundamental workings, including the most fundamental levels of concepts, logic, and information processing, ultimately invoking the metaphysics of mind to explain why reality is intelligible to us. 

Defining core subjectivity, phenomenal states, and intentional states

Core subjectivity encapsulates the essence of subjective experience, reflecting the inherent awareness that defines consciousness. It is the foundational aspect through which an individual engages with the world, encompassing the entirety of conscious phenomena. This term draws inspiration from the works of Dan Zahavi, who emphasizes the pre-reflective and immediate nature of subjectivity (Zahavi, 1999). In the context of our framework, core subjectivity serves as the overarching identity. It is the fundamental level of mind that can be reached and experienced in states of pure consciousness. 

Meanwhile, phenomenal consciousness pertains to the qualitative, experiential aspect of consciousness—what it is like to undergo a particular mental state. Thomas Metzinger, in “Being No One” (2003), argues that phenomenal consciousness is not merely a passive reflection of the external world but an active process. It involves the raw, subjective feel of sensations, emotions, and perceptions. In our framework, phenomenal consciousness represents one facet (or mode or “person”) of core subjectivity. It is the “what it is like to be” quality of experience, as defined by Thomas Nagel (1974).

Intentionality refers to the inherent aboutness or directedness of mental states towards objects or states of affairs. Edmund Husserl, in “Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology” (1913), laid the groundwork for understanding intentionality as a constitutive feature of consciousness. For example, when we perceive an object or reflect upon an object of thought, we intend those objects. As Franz Brentano said, intentionality is the “mark of the mind” (1874/1973).

It is critical to understand that core subjectivity (the pure consciousness state) entails both phenomenality and intentionality. Specifically, when one enters the pure consciousness state, there is something that it is like to be core subjectivity. Put another way, there is something that it is like to be. It is what existence itself “feels like.” Simultaneously, one’s awareness is aware of itself as core subjectivity in the pure consciousness state. It has been suggested by some that this reflection of awareness is necessarily an instance of meta-consciousness, but this is problematic. Meta-consciousness is, by definition, the representation of contents of the mind (Schooler, 2002). However, in the pure consciousness state there are no contents of mind to be represented, again by definition. The experiencer simply is their core subjectivity, without any objects objecting to the subject. As such, the directedness of the experience of pure consciousness cannot be due to meta-cognitive processes. Rather, it must be an intentionality fundamental to the mind and identifiable with the phenomenality of core subjectivity, a claim which fits with the assertions of strong phenomenal intentionality theory.

Phenomenal intentionality theory

Phenomenal intentionality theory constitutes a cornerstone in contemporary discussions on consciousness, elucidating the intricate relationship between subjective experience and intentional mental states. At its core, this theory posits that intentionality is deeply entwined with the phenomenal character of subjective experience. Moreover, strong phenomenal intentionality theory, as argued for by the Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind, asserts that all intentional states are phenomenal states, in that there is nothing to intentional states over and above phenomenal states (McLaughlin, Beckermann, & Walter, 2011). 

The origins of phenomenal intentionality theory can be traced back to the works of philosophers such as Franz Brentano and Edmund Husserl, who laid the groundwork for exploring intentionality as a fundamental feature of consciousness. Brentano, in his seminal work “Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint” (1874/1973), emphasized the inherent intentional structure of mental states, asserting that all mental acts are directed towards something. In essence, there is no cognitive act that lacks intentionality. This foundational idea set the stage for later developments in phenomenology and intentional philosophy.

Contemporary proponents of phenomenal intentionality theory, notably Uriah Kriegel, have extended and refined these ideas in the modern context. Kriegel’s “The Sources of Intentionality” (2011) delves into the relationship between intentionality and consciousness, arguing that the phenomenal character of an experience is intrinsic to its intentional content. In other words, what makes an experience intentional is intimately tied to its subjective, qualitative aspects.

According to phenomenal intentionality theory, the intentionality of mental states is not a separate layer added to consciousness but emerges inherently from or–in the case of strong phenomenal intentional theory–is identifiable with the phenomenal properties of experience. The theory challenges traditional views that treat intentionality and phenomenality as distinct aspects of consciousness, such as separatism, tracking theories, and functional role theories (McLaughlin, Beckermann, & Walter, 2011), which we discuss below. Instead, it proposes a holistic understanding, wherein the very nature of awareness inherently involves both directedness (intentionality) and qualitative experience (phenomenality).

As we navigate our exploration of core subjectivity, recognizing the claims of phenomenal intentionality theory becomes pivotal. Its asserted interplay between intentionality and phenomenality lays the groundwork for our Trinitarian framework, where these elements coalesce into a unified identity of the experiencer.

Critique of alternatives: tracking theories and functional role theories

While phenomenal intentionality theory provides a compelling account of the interplay between consciousness and intentionality, it is essential to critically evaluate alternative perspectives—specifically, tracking theories and functional role theories. Indeed, one of the primary arguments for phenomenal intentionality theory is that it does not face insoluble problems, unlike these opponent theories. 

First, tracking theories propose that the intentionality of mental states is grounded in their tracking or correlation with external objects or states of affairs. According to Fred Dretske’s influential work, “Naturalizing the Mind” (1995), mental states gain their intentionality by virtue of being reliable indicators of external entities. This approach emphasizes the causal relationship between mental states and the external world, and is a distinctly physicalist interpretation of intentionality. 

However, a central critique of tracking theories arises from their potential to overlook the intrinsic, qualitative aspects of consciousness. By focusing solely on the external correlation, these theories risk neglecting the nuanced, subjective character of intentional mental states. Specifically, there are the infamous mismatch cases, which lead tracking theories to the insoluble mismatch problem. These are cases in which the asserted representation in the mind does not match anything that it is supposed to be tracking. For instance, the experience of “redness” is supposedly the representation of the physical object that the mind is tracking under tracking theories. For “redness,” that object is electromagnetic radiation wavelengths. However, this assertion encounters a very strict version of the hard problem of consciousness stemming from Leibniz’s law. Namely, there is an infinite difference in the higher-order properties of the experience “redness” and the wavelength that the mind is supposedly tracking. The experience is purely qualitative, whereas the physical entity is purely quantitative, meaning that they share no higher order properties in common (Chalmers, 1996). Therefore, by Leibniz’s law of the indiscernibility of identicals, the properties of the experience and the object must be distinct (Forrest, 2008). This, of course, is the definition of the hard problem of consciousness (Chalmers, 1996, 2007; Kastrup, 2019), and a rather insoluble version of it thanks to Leibniz. In this case, we cannot even say how a physical entity could causally engage with consciousness at all and in-principle, let alone give an account for this specific case of intentionality and phenomenality. 

Indeed, this same problem arises for any qualitative experience that tracking theories try to explain. As the Oxford Handbook details, the standard account of the hard problem does not go far enough in describing the problem for tracking theories. Against the standard account, physicalists could say that a lack of inferability of mental facts from physical facts might be explained in terms of representations and illusions. However, in mismatch cases, “the differences in higher order properties entail non-identity (by Leibniz’s law). On the face of it, the typical physicalist reply is not applicable” (McLaughlin, Beckermann, & Walter, 2011). The mismatch problem, in turn, actually strengthens the hard problem of consciousness’s insolubility, if tracking theories are taken to be the best option on offer for a physical account of intentionality. Phenomenal intentionality theory, in contrast, highlights the inseparable connection between intentionality and phenomenality, underscoring the importance of subjective experience in shaping intentional content (Kriegel, 2011).

Meanwhile, functional role theories contend that the intentionality of mental states is determined by their functional roles within a cognitive system. Proponents of functionalism, such as David Lewis in “Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications” (1972), argue that mental states derive their meaning and intentionality from their causal relations and roles within a broader cognitive network. The claim is that the logical relations between objects of the mind are the product of causal relations between physical objects outside of the mind (again offering a potential physicalist explanation). The logical relations then supposedly determine the specific contents of a given experience. 

However, logical relations are not sufficient for determining contents (Bourget & Mendelovici, 2016). This leads functional role theories into the underdetermination problem. Hilary Putnam’s analysis, articulated in “The Meaning of ‘Meaning'” (1975), sheds light on this issue, emphasizing the inherent limitations of functionalism in providing a complete account of mental content. According to Putnam, functional role theories are susceptible to multiple realizability—the idea that the same functional organization or role can be instantiated by different physical states. This poses a challenge to functionalism’s ability to precisely determine the content or meaning of mental states solely based on their functional roles.

For instance, consider two distinct physical systems that perform the same cognitive functions. If mental content is solely determined by functional roles, these systems would be attributed the same mental content, despite potentially having different underlying physical structures. Putnam’s thought experiment involving twin-earth scenarios, where chemically identical substances have different meanings due to different functional roles, highlights the underdetermination problem. This suggests that functional role theories alone cannot fully specify the content of mental states, as the same functions can be realized by diverse physical structures with different meanings. 

Therefore, while functional role theories excel in explaining the functional contributions of mental states, they fall short in providing a unique determination of intentional content. Phenomenal intentionality theory, with its emphasis on the intrinsic connection between phenomenality and intentionality, offers a more nuanced perspective that transcends the underdetermination problem by considering both the functional roles and the qualitative aspects of consciousness (McLaughlin, Beckermann, & Walter, 2011).

But it gets worse for functional role theories. They, like tracking theories, run headlong into the hard problem of consciousness and Leibniz’s law. Specifically, causality between physical entities can be exhaustively described using quantities, like mass, spin, charge, momentum, etc. But logical connections between ideas, concepts, and constructs, are purely qualitative. As such, we can merely repeat the same objections from the above section on tracking theories when critiquing functional role theories. Between causation and logic is an infinite gap, with no in-common higher order properties available for a bridging operation. Phenomenal intentionality theory, by emphasizing the intrinsic connection between phenomenality and intentionality, offers a more comprehensive account that integrates the qualitative aspects of consciousness with its intentional structure.

Indeed, this leaves phenomenal intentionality theory as the last option standing. But which version of phenomenal intentionality theory–moderate or strong–is preferable remains to be seen.

The case for strong phenomenal intentionality theory

Phenomenal intentionality theories, while united in emphasizing the intrinsic connection between intentionality and phenomenality, diverge on the degree to which phenomenal properties determine intentional content. This contrast manifests in moderate phenomenal intentionality theory and strong phenomenal intentionality theory.

Moderate phenomenal intentionality theory asserts that phenomenal properties contribute to, but do not wholly determine, intentional content. Represented by figures like David Papineau, this position acknowledges the influence of qualitative aspects of consciousness on the aboutness of mental states. According to Papineau’s “Thinking about Consciousness” (2002), phenomenal properties play a role in shaping intentional content but are not the sole determinants.

In this view, intentional content may be influenced by both phenomenal properties and external factors, allowing for a certain level of flexibility in the determination of meaning. The moderate stance attempts to strike a balance between acknowledging the importance of phenomenality and accommodating the potential impact of external factors on intentional content.

In contrast, strong phenomenal intentionality theory posits that intentional content is entirely determined by phenomenal properties. Proponents of this view, like Martine Nida-Rümelin, argue that the intrinsic qualitative character of consciousness uniquely specifies the intentional content of mental states. In Nida-Rümelin’s “Consciousness and Intentionality” (2007), the theory is presented as a more stringent position where phenomenal properties exclusively fix intentional content.

In strong phenomenal intentionality theory, the qualitative richness of consciousness takes center stage, and external factors are deemed irrelevant to the determination of intentional content. This position takes an eliminative approach to dealing with raised objections, such as the existence of states that are intentional but that seem not to be phenomenal. These could include complex thoughts with abstract concepts, wide intentional states, and standing propositional attitudes (knowledge that we have but do not currently recall at a given time t). Note that this “eliminative” approach has nothing to do with the physicalist position of “eliminativism” that attempts to resolve the hard problem of consciousness by explaining away phenomenal states altogether. The eliminative argument made by proponents of strong phenomenal intentionality theory is that such intentional but not phenomenal states do not exist; rather, all states of mind are perforce phenomenal. The Oxford Handbook deals with these in some depth (McLaughlin, Beckermann, & Walter, 2011), but the argument therein can be simplified with the statement: any conscious experience is perforce phenomenally conscious, because any experience must be had by an experiencer, and this requires a perspective. Without the “what it is like to be” of phenomenality, there is no experiencer that can have experiences. Since there is something that it is like to be in a state of pure consciousness, there must be something that it is like to have any experience one could posit, or indeed could have. 

Strong phenomenal intentionality theory is also preferable because it aligns more seamlessly with the holistic perspective of core subjectivity, where phenomenality, intentionality, and awareness coalesce into a unified identity. In other words, strong phenomenal intentionality theory gives us an avenue of explaining another core feature of consciousness that defies explanation by physicalist theories grounded in causal chains of atomistic physical entities: the unity of experience (Hart, 2013). The strong stance acknowledges the primacy of phenomenality in shaping intentional content, promoting a more integrated understanding of consciousness.

Moreover, the strong position offers a clearer and more straightforward account of the relationship between phenomenality and intentionality. By positing an exclusive determination of intentional content by phenomenal properties, it creates an identity relationship between the two, and thus does not encounter any problems with Leibniz’s law. Logically, this is required at the fundamental level of mind anyway, since core subjectivity would be nothingness without phenomenality and would be contentless without the ability to intend objects. Since both phenomenality and intentionality are required for a mind to exist at all, let alone for us to have intelligible access to reality, there must be an identity relationship between core subjectivity, phenomenality, and intentionality.

Therefore, strong phenomenal intentionality theory emerges as the most favorable perspective. We now have the elements we need to solidify a “Trinitarian” view of core subjectivity, phenomenality, and intentionality, in which core subjectivity functions as the “monad” of the mind, with modes of phenomenality and intentionality. Crucially, if strong phenomenal intentionality theory is correct, then the distinction in modes does not require a distinction in essence, nature, or identity. Here we see a Platonic view of essence and mode, in which the essence of a thing does not change when it adopts distinct modes. This is in contrast to Aristotle’s view of the same, which takes the opposite perspective and is largely adopted by physicalism (Sherrard, 1973). We argue that it is this triadic structure of mind to which the Trinitarian views point, perhaps influenced by spiritual experiences constituted by altered states of consciousness, including the pure consciousness state. Those views can now be adapted by cognitive science and philosophy of mind to make sense of these elements of consciousness.

Convergence with “Trinitarian” philosophies and religious traditions

In this section, we’ll provide two model examples of prominent Trinitarian philosophies, one from Western culture and one from Eastern culture: Orthodox Christianity and Advaita Vedanta. Then, we’ll compare those philosophies to strong phenomenal intentionality theory. 

Trinitarianism in Orthodox Christianity presents a triadic structure consisting of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. This framework can be compared to a model where there is a ground state of existence, an instantiation of existence as an existing experiencer, and an energy of change. Similar ideas can be found in Hindu philosophy, especially Vedantic thought. 

• God the Father and Sat (Ground State of Existence): In Orthodox Christianity, God the Father is often perceived as the ultimate ground of Being, or existence itself. This is in contrast to the late-modern Christian definition of God as the supreme being, a kind of intelligent designer akin to the demiurge of Plato (Hart, 2013). Being itself serves as the highest level of reality, and thus aligns with the concept of Sat in Vedantic thought, signifying the absolute reality or ground state of existence (Lossky, 1976; Swami Sivananda, 1997). Both the Father and Sat represent the unchanging, eternal aspect of the divine nature, serving as the foundation for subsequent manifestations.
• God the Son and Cit (Instantiation of Existence as an Existing Experiencer): The second person of the Trinity, Jesus Christ, is considered the incarnate Word of God and the Logos, representing the organized, intelligible forms that allow the ground state of existence to instantiate itself as existing creation. Without this aspect of the Trinitarian view, Being could not take the form of beings. In this comparison, the Son aligns with Cit in Vedantic thought. Both the Son and Cit signify the dynamic, conscious nature of the divine, where existence is not just a passive state but is intimately connected with self-awareness and the objects of awareness (Lossky, 1976; Swami Sivananda, 1997).
• God the Holy Spirit and Ānanda (Energy of Change): The Holy Spirit, as the third person of the Trinity, is seen as the active presence of God in the world, the agent and spirit of change that prevents existence from falling into a state of stasis. This corresponds to Ānanda in Vedantic thought, representing bliss or divine joy. Both the Spirit and Ānanda signify the energy of change and transformative power within the divine, emphasizing the experiential dimension and profound bliss associated with realization (Lossky, 1976; Swami Sivananda, 1997).

In this comparison, the Trinitarian framework of Orthodox Christianity and the Vedantic concept of Saccidānanda converge in their recognition of a ground state of existence, an instantiation of existence as an existing experiencer, and an energy of change.

Drawing upon the parallels between these Trinitarian models and the previously discussed components of consciousness—core subjectivity, phenomenality, and intentionality—we can discern a compelling alignment that presents a Trinitarian model of consciousness. Core subjectivity can be likened to the ground state of existence within the mind. It represents the foundational awareness, the Being that underlies all conscious experiences (Zahavi, 1999). Phenomenality corresponds to the instantiation of existence within consciousness, as a perspective from which existence acts as a being, rather than as an empty ground state of Being without form. It captures the qualitative, experiential aspects of consciousness, representing “what it is like to be” (Metzinger, 2003). Finally, intentionality is the agent of change that allows core subjectivity to intend objects, thus bringing those objects into existence for the subject (Kriegel, 2011).

In this Trinitarian model, core subjectivity serves as the foundational awareness, phenomenality instantiates existence within consciousness, and intentionality acts as the dynamic force that brings about changes within the mental realm. Together, they form an integrated whole and a unified field of experience, which is necessarily and simultaneously one and three. 

It is only under this kind of Trinitarian model that the mind can be coherent. It is worth repeating that all three of these elements must be identifiable with each other. Without phenomenality, there would be no organizing categories of mind or quality of experience to core subjectivity, and no intentionality (as all intentional states are phenomenal states under strong phenomenal intentionality theory). Without intentionality, there would be something it is like to be core subjectivity, but no objects of the subject could ever be possible. As such, the mind’s awareness could never be aware of anything. It would be trapped in a state of contentless stasis, forever a field of nothingness. And, of course, without core subjectivity (existence), neither phenomenality nor intentionality would be possible. 

Implications for perception and the intelligibility of reality

The Trinitarian dynamics of consciousness, encompassing core subjectivity, phenomenality, and intentionality, play a pivotal role in making reality intelligible for us. This intelligibility stems from the inherent connection between consciousness and the fundamental concept of existence, grounded in binary logic. Understanding the logical priority of existence provides insights into how our cognitive processes unfold and how reality becomes intelligible.

Existence is logically prior to all other cognitive processes. We cannot grasp what something is, how something is, why something is, or what something does unless we first establish that it is. As such, existence is our fundamental concept. Likewise, binary logic serves as the foundational framework for expressing existence. Existence can be represented as TRUE (1) and non-existence as FALSE (0). When we apprehend anything, its existence amounts to being TRUE (1) in binary logic. This binary framework is fundamental to our cognitive processes and is the basis for all reasoning, including all other logics; we have to consider, say, symbolic logic as existing before we can even think about it, which already entails the binary logical distinction between its existence (TRUE) and non-existence (FALSE) (Smith, 2019). Moreover, when cognizing a thing, the first bit of information processed corresponds to that thing’s existence. Existence is denoted by 1, affirming the truth that the thing is, while non-existence is represented by 0, signifying the absence of existence. Intentionality, as a dynamic force in consciousness, directs our awareness toward the existence of objects. The intentional act involves recognizing the first bit of information, indicating whether something exists or not (Kriegel, 2011).

Of course, for reality to be intelligible to us (and it must be, if perception, science, and philosophy are to be possible), there must be shared logical and structural properties between mind and reality itself. In computation theory, an acceptor processes input according to a predefined syntax. Only information conforming to this accepting syntax is successfully recognized and processed by the acceptor. Similarly, our cognitive structure, comprised of core subjectivity, phenomenality, and intentionality, can be seen as an acceptor. To comprehend and make sense of reality, incoming information must align with the accepting syntax inherent in our cognitive processes (Piccinini, 2015).

For this to happen, the structure of reality must be isomorphic to our cognitive structure at their respective fundamental levels; under no other circumstance can intelligibility be possible. Isomorphism ensures a structural alignment between the information present in reality and the cognitive processes that apprehend and interpret that information. The metaphorical “syntax” of reality, representing the inherent nature of existence and non-existence, must be compatible with the cognitive “syntax” that characterizes our consciousness. This alignment is essential for meaningful engagement with and understanding of the world (Piccinini, 2015). Information that conforms to the accepting syntax of our cognitive structure becomes comprehensible. It allows us to recognize the first bit of information about a given thing—its existence—and process subsequent details coherently.

Therefore, the fundamental nature of reality must mirror the intricate dynamics of consciousness to be comprehensible and meaningfully engaged with. Next, we’ll look at the implications this has for metaphysics. 

Implications for metaphysics

Since an isomorphism must be present between the structure of our minds and reality, we can use the structure of mind to learn about the structure of reality. And, since core subjectivity is Trinitarian in nature, we should expect to see a similar triadic structure at the fundamental level of reality. 

Therefore, idealism emerges as the most compelling metaphysical framework, and the Trinitarian structure of the mind can thus be extended to fundamental consciousness. Analytic idealism, as advocated by Bernardo Kastrup, provides a robust example of how this extension is not only viable but also coherent, consistent, explanatory, and parsimonious (Kastrup, 2019). In this perspective, “Mind-at-Large” is posited as the fundamental ground of reality, embodying existence, phenomenality, and intentionality, and exhibiting personal characteristics rather than impersonality. 

“Mind-at-Large” in analytic idealism can be understood as composed of the Trinitarian elements, though Kastrup does not explicitly argue in this manner. As such, this paper’s contribution to analytic idealist thought is to apply the Trinitarian view described herein to the “Mind-at-Large” of Kastrup’s model. Existence forms the ground state, phenomenality represents the instantiation of existence within consciousness, and intentionality serves as the dynamic force shaping and recognizing the content of consciousness. This extension maintains a harmonious unity between the structure of fundamental consciousness and the Trinitarian structure of individual minds, providing a coherent and integrated perspective on reality that ensures intelligibility. The way in which these three aspects explain how and why content arises within the mind can then also be extended to how and why the contents of reality arise for “Mind-at-Large.”

“Mind-at-Large” then takes on personal characteristics rather than being impersonal. This aligns with the Trinitarian concept of a personal God in theological traditions. The intentional aspect of consciousness suggests purpose, recognition, and personal engagement with the content of consciousness, akin to a personal mind (Kastrup, 2018). It must be noted that Kastrup explicitly argues against anthropomorphizing “Mind-at-Large” by ascribing meta-consciousness to it. However, we’ve already dispensed with the incoherent conflation that some make between intentionality and meta-consciousness at the level of core subjectivity.

In short, idealism is the only viable metaphysics because all other options exclude the possibility of existence, instantiated order, and change itself, and thus preclude intelligibility. For example, physicalism takes the physical order to be what exists. However, existence, phenomenality, and intentionality are all purely qualitative and not at all quantitative, and so cannot be explained by physical causation, even in principle. Indeed, existence is logically prior to the entire physical order, and thus out of physicalism’s purview by the physicalist’s own definitions and claims. Similar problems afflict all other theories that take physicality to be fundamental, including dualism and panpsychism. It is only if consciousness is fundamental that existence, experience, and knowledge are possible at all. Therefore, any theory of metaphysics, ontology, and reality must entail a triadic monism, in which the reduction base is at once one and three. For the theologians, the answer is necessarily panentheism, rather than theism, pantheism, or deism. Such theological debates are beyond the scope of this paper, however, and for our purposes it will suffice to say that idealism is the only defensible metaphysics given the workings of the mind and the interdependence of epistemology and ontology on one another. 

Of course, this is precisely the stance taken in the Consciousness-Reality Integration Theory (CRIT) (Santos, 2023).

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