Introduction
The major metaphysical worldviews of today–physicalism, dualism, panpsychism, and idealism–can be categorized in a number of ways. However, one of the most critical distinctions to draw is between those worldviews which take the physical order to be fundamental and the lone worldview which does not. Doing so places physicalism, dualism, and panpsychism on one side of the categorical divide and idealism on the other. Of course, it is idealism’s choice of taking consciousness (herein defined as core subjectivity, the fundamental level of mind) as fundamental that sets it apart from the others; by contrast, physicalism takes exclusively the physical order, dualism takes both consciousness and the physical order, and panpsychism takes the physical order while also asserting that consciousness is a fundamental property of physical entities.
As a result, we can further categorize these worldviews by distinguishing those which are intentional from those which are accidental (Manion, 1999). Herein, “intentional” refers to intentionality, the term for the directedness or “aboutness” of the mind. As such, an intentional world is also a teleological world, or one with inherent meaning, purpose, and direction. An accidental world is one that arises by chance. It has no meaning, purpose, or direction at all, though it may be determined in the sense that each accidental event is part of a long chain of accidental cause-effect interactions. Determinism is not to be mistaken for teleology or intentionality, however, and so the accidental world has no directedness, despite the fact that there is a sequential series of these determined events.
One can easily place idealism in the intentional category and physicalism in the accidental category. Dualism and panpsychism are harder to place, as they skirt the line between the truly incommensurate worldviews of the idealist and physicalist. Until the interaction problem of dualism is solved–if it can be solved at all–that worldview must be categorized as both, since consciousness is intentional and the physical order is accidental. Meanwhile, constitutive panpsychists may wish their view to be categorized as accidental, since this flavor of panpsychism is essentially physicalism for those who have given up on solving the hard problem of consciousness by traditional physicalist arguments. By contrast, those panpsychists who espouse cosmopsychism may view the world as intentional, with the fundamental property of consciousness infusing the physical order with purpose. However, because the core assertion of cosmopsychism is that the universe is conscious, and because this would still entail that the universe is a derivative entity determined by the properties of its physical parts, it is hard to see how the panpsychist can avoid the same choice as the dualist; cosmopsychism is both intentional and accidental.
Naturally, an intentional world looks very different from an accidental world. A theory’s categorization will decide its stance on the origins of reality, our place in it, and what we can know about it. As such, the question of whether or not reality is intentional or accidental is, at heart, just as much one of epistemology as metaphysics. An intentional world involves a coupling of the finite mind of the conscious agent and the fundamental mind that is reality. By contrast, an accidental world entails no such coupling; rather, its epistemology is grounded in the finite mind and in nothing else. Such a world’s epistemology has no objectivity, but is instead a psychological construction.
This paper leverages the history of epistemology to argue that an accidental worldview is self-defeating, as it precludes the possibility of all that it must epistemically presuppose: knowledge, reason, logic, and meaning. Indeed, existence itself, which is logically prior to all other categories and which forms the foundation of the mind’s deepest cognitive organization, is impossible to account for under such a worldview. Any metaphysical theory that asserts the fundamentality of the physical order will be accidental, and as such, will entail a theory of knowledge that is man-made, arbitrary, undefined, and incoherent. Such a theory of knowledge is no theory of knowledge at all, and so a worldview of this kind describes an unintelligible reality. Therefore, the worldview defeats itself, as its own beliefs are unjustified, owing to the fact that knowledge is impossible under its epistemic paradigm.
The choice will then be between value fundamentalism and value nihilism. In other words, if the correct worldview cannot be accidental, then we must choose the intentional worldview or embrace utter absurdity, with no reason to believe–or, for that matter, do–anything at all. Since value nihilism is also, by definition, a self-defeating position, the only option remaining will be to see the world as intentional. Thus, idealism must be true.
Evaluating rationalism
Rationalism posits that reason is the primary source of knowledge, emphasizing the role of a priori principles and deductive reasoning in understanding the world (Descartes, 1641; Leibniz, 1685). It often relies on innate ideas and pure reason as foundations for knowledge. Rationalists argue that certain truths are self-evident and can be known independently of sensory experience. As we’ll see, an accidental worldview encounters problems when taking this to be its epistemology.
First, this reliance on a priori principles raises questions about the origin and justification of these innate ideas. Critics argue that the claim of innate ideas lacks empirical support, challenging the rationalist’s assertion of self-evident truths. The empiricist objection, exemplified by John Locke’s “Tabula Rasa,” suggests that the mind starts as a blank slate, acquiring knowledge through sensory experiences (Locke, 1690). Without empirical evidence for innate ideas, epistemic rationalism struggles to establish a secure foundation for its core principles.
Furthermore, the epistemic gap between innate ideas and their application in the real world poses challenges. While rationalists argue for the universality of certain principles, the diversity of human experiences and perspectives raises questions about the cultural and contextual biases inherent in these purportedly universal truths. In addition, the dependence on deductive reasoning faces limitations when confronted with the complexity and uncertainty of the empirical world. The world’s intricacies often require inductive reasoning and empirical observation, challenging the exclusivity of rationalism’s deductive approach.
Evaluating empiricism
Empiricism, in contrast to rationalism, posits that knowledge is derived primarily from sensory experiences (Locke, 1690; Hume, 1748). As mentioned above, empiricists argue that the mind begins as a blank slate, acquiring knowledge through sensory experiences (Locke, 1690). Empiricism, like rationalism, encounters epistemic problems within an accidental worldview.
Its reliance on sensory input raises questions about the reliability and universality of empirical data. Variability in individual perceptions and the subjectivity of sensory experiences challenge the empiricist’s claim to objective and universally applicable knowledge. Furthermore, the empiricist’s rejection of innate ideas and emphasis on sensory input may struggle to account for abstract concepts and necessary truths. Without concepts as fundamental as existence itself, how could the empiricist know that they exist? Without the concepts of causality, quantity, value, etc., how could the empiricist justify their beliefs that are derived from perception?
Of course, the idealist will go a step further by pointing out that, even if our ideas come from perceptions, those perceptions are mental activities. There is no way, even in principle, to empirically verify the existence of a material world outside of mind, as all acts of perception are cognitive, phenomenal experiences. Those experiences may be describable by means of both qualities and quantities, in so far as we can map mathematics onto our perceptions. However, it is a non-sequitur to then assert that the same quantitative descriptions of those perceptions are themselves ontic entities, which is precisely the claim of all theories which take the physical order–that which is exhaustively describable by quantities–as fundamental. If we perceive a car, the inclination of the physicalist, for instance, would be to make the following two assertions:
I. I perceive a car.
II. There is a car independent of my consciousness.
Strictly speaking, the first of these is empirically sound. However, the second assertion does not logically follow from the first. It constitutes a metaphysical claim, not a strictly empirical one, as it posits the existence of a substance over and above the mind and its perceptual experiences. Of course, the physicalist will then go on to say that it is this other substance that generates the mind, an even bolder assertion that is not empirically justified.
In short, this is a case of trying to pull the epistemic territory out of the epistemic map. Therefore, for the honest empiricist, belief in the existence of a material world is completely unjustifiable. Thus, an empiricist is unjustified in being a physicalist, dualist, or panpsychist, and must be an idealist instead. Some of the greatest names in philosophy have conceded this point, including Bertrand Russell (1912).
The problem of induction poses a significant challenge to empiricism. David Hume highlighted the difficulty in justifying the inference from past observations to future events (Hume, 1748). The assumption that future events will conform to past patterns relies on an inductive leap that empiricism struggles to rationally justify. As such, an accidentalist empiricist is not justified in believing in the uniformity of nature, which all of science presupposes.
Hume references Leibniz’s analytic/synthetic distinction in his claim that only those beliefs that are either analytically true or empirically verifiable are rational beliefs. For him, there is no empirical basis for belief in an external material world, nor is there a basis for believing in a mental world. Indeed, if our experience is limited to perception–as the empiricist claims–then there is no way to tell if our perceptions are caused by materiality or mentality. No affirmation beyond perception is justifiable for Hume. Caught in his empiricist net is also the sense of self, which he considers another unjustified dogma, since we never perceive the self that supposedly does the perceiving and has the experiences. As such, since the concepts of external and internal worlds are not empirical, they are absurd for Hume.
The same applies to other unperceived concepts, like the identity of an object over time and causality itself. In both of these cases, we perceive a sequence of events, but we never directly perceive the identity of an object or the connection between two objects interacting. Instead, we get only sequential snapshots.
For Hume, all of these examples are products of the mind, and as such, the reasons for believing in them are psychological, not empirical.
However, even Hume is not beyond empiricist critique. After all, the analytic/synthetic distinction he borrowed from Leibniz is not itself empirical or perceivable. Thus, the ground of his arguments is rendered absurd as well, along with the external and internal worlds, causality, identity, and all the rest. On top of that, how can Hume categorize sequences of events as belonging in a sequence, since “sequences” and “categories” are abstract concepts that are neither empirical nor perceivable? All ways of identifying or categorizing the world must, then, also be absurd. For that matter, empiricism itself is neither empirical nor perceivable, so it defeats itself. This, of course, destroys the intelligibility of reality, leaving absolute absurdity and value nihilism as our only justifiable options, neither of which are actually tenable.
The absurdity of empiricism as an epistemological project notwithstanding, Hume did raise a critical problem that must be addressed in any worldview. For any theory of knowledge to be true, we must already know a priori what reality is, what we are, and how the two interact.
Further down, this paper will argue that idealism solves this problem by taking that which is epistemically fundamental–consciousness–to be metaphysically fundamental.
Of course, Kant thought along those same lines, though in a flawed manner that sabotaged his efforts from the start. Kant’s philosophy represents a crucial attempt to reconcile the challenges posed by Hume’s empiricism, particularly the problem of induction and the limitations of sensory experience in providing a foundation for knowledge. Kant’s response is articulated in his critical philosophy, notably in his work “Critique of Pure Reason” (Kant, 1781).
Hume had questioned the basis for our knowledge of cause and effect, arguing that our belief in the connection between events was not rationally justified but was rather a habit of thought based on repeated observations. Kant, recognizing the limitations of pure empiricism, sought to address these issues by introducing the ideas of a priori knowledge and transcendental idealism. He argued that while Hume was correct in highlighting the inadequacy of empirical experiences alone, there are certain concepts and principles that are not derived from sensory experience but are necessary for the very possibility of experience. These non-perceivable concepts, according to Kant, are a priori and are the conditions that make experience and knowledge possible.
Key to Kant’s response was his distinction between phenomena (appearances) and noumena (things-in-themselves). While we can only know phenomena through sensory experience, Kant argued that the mind contributes certain a priori concepts or “categories” that structure our experience and make it intelligible. These categories, such as causality, substance, and unity, are not derived from sensory impressions but are inherent structures of the mind that shape our perception of the world.
In essence, Kant posited that our knowledge is a synthesis of sensory experience and the a priori categories of the mind. The categories serve as the necessary framework through which we organize and understand the chaotic data of empirical sensations. This move was Kant’s attempt to rescue certain fundamental concepts, like causality, from Humean skepticism by arguing that they are not derived from experience but are conditions for the possibility of experience. Kant’s transcendental idealism thus aimed to establish a middle ground between rationalism and empiricism, acknowledging the importance of sensory experience while asserting the necessity of a priori structures for coherent knowledge.
The problem with Kant’s view is that it suffers from an idiosyncratic dualism, in that he asserted a gap between the noumenal and the phenomenal realms. For him, those a priori categories do not describe properties of the noumena, but rather only the phenomena. Kant succeeded in arguing that those abstract concepts, categories, and mental structures are necessary for experience, but he rejects any inductive coupling between the mind and reality. As such, he doesn’t really address Hume’s critique at all. He merely reaffirms Hume’s claim that those concepts are psychological, with no connection to the world itself. As such, Hume’s critique stands.
However, current versions of idealism, like Bernardo Kastrup’s analytic idealism (Kastrup, 2019) and Donald Hoffman’s conscious realism (Hoffman, 2019), reject Kant’s noumenal-phenomenal distinction. Instead, they acknowledge an inductive coupling between the noumena and phenomena. While our perception may not give us a literal view of reality in and of itself, it does give us true information about reality. As such, that information must conform to the structure of our minds, the way that computation theory states that information must conform to accepting syntax (Piccinini, 2015). In this case, there is no gap, but instead a shared set of logical and structural properties between fundamental consciousness and its finite instantiation. Fundamental mind experiences itself from a finite perspective, and as such, has the experiences of thinking, self-hood, language, perception, etc. The finite mind and the fundamental mind are, in fact, the same, and so the categories are shared between them. Such an intentional worldview does, in fact, respond to and overcome Hume. However, Hume’s critique remains devastating to the other metaphysical theories–physicalism, dualism, and panpsychism–which are accidental worldviews.
Evaluating foundationalism
Foundationalism is a philosophical approach that posits knowledge as resting on a set of foundational beliefs or self-evident truths (Descartes, 1641). These foundational beliefs serve as the secure and indubitable basis upon which all other knowledge is built. However, there are significant problems with this epistemology in an accidental world as well.
René Descartes, a prominent foundationalist, sought indubitable foundations through his famous statement “Cogito, ergo sum” (I think, therefore I am) (Descartes, 1641). The idea was to establish a self-evident truth as the foundation for knowledge. The “Cogito” has since been called into question by a league of philosophers, not least of which by Russell. Those criticisms focus on the presuppositions that this statement makes, such as that language has meaning, that “I” is an intelligible self, that thinking is something that really occurs, etc. As such, Descartes had not yet reached the bottom level of truth after all.
One challenge is the potential for infinite regress. Foundationalism assumes a set of basic beliefs that require no further justification. However, critics, exemplified by Hume, argue that any belief, no matter how basic, can be questioned and may demand its own justification, leading to an infinite chain of justifications (Hume, 1748).
Furthermore, foundationalism faces the dilemma of circular reasoning. If the justification for foundational beliefs relies on other beliefs, it risks circularity, rendering the foundation less secure. The demand for non-circular justifications places foundationalism in a precarious position. Of course, at the most fundamental level of reality, we will expect to find circular reasoning, since reality is all that exists, by definition. Any theory that correctly maps onto this fundamental level will, therefore, be tautological, or true by its own structure. However, for epistemic claims at the normative level, circular reasoning remains fallacious.
Indeed, the foundationalist claims that there are both beliefs that are justified by other beliefs and beliefs that are the foundation for all other beliefs. If we’re asked to justify a belief, we can either give an answer or not. If we don’t, then we’re not justified in that belief, but rather take it on faith. In other words, our belief is arbitrary in that case. If we do give an answer, then our justification for that belief is based on other beliefs, which now require justification in turn. Importantly, we can’t use previously justified beliefs to justify this next group of beliefs, or we’ll have circular reasoning. We also can’t use the belief in question to justify itself, for that would be begging the question. And we can’t keep referencing a chain of endless beliefs, for that leads to infinite regress.
Coherentism offers a response to foundationalism’s challenges by proposing an alternative approach to the justification of knowledge. A coherentist rejects the idea of basic, foundational beliefs that are justified independently of other beliefs. Instead, they posit that the justification of any belief is contextual and arises from its coherence within a broader system of beliefs. In a coherentist framework, the interconnectedness and mutual support among beliefs are crucial for their justification.
However, coherentism suffers from the problem that it essentially elevates all beliefs to foundational status, and so it is really just a flavor of foundationalism. For an accidental worldview, this negates the intended benefit of appealing to such a holistic system.
By contrast, for the intentional worldview, a kind of holistic, coherentist system is necessary, because any true reality theory that maps onto reality in every way will constitute a web of beliefs that form a self-justifying, self-verifying paradigm, which is self-contained and self-referential due to the fact that reality is, by definition, all that is. Crucially, only an intentional world could have this self-referential, tautological structure, since there is an arrow of intentionality inherent to that self-reference. Meanwhile, an accidental world precludes all intentionality, and thus cannot appeal to coherentism as a solution to the challenges faced by foundationalism.
As a result of those challenges, the foundationalist will often say something like, “Our explanations have to stop somewhere,” and then cut off the explanations and arbitrarily declare the level at which they stopped to be foundational. This, of course, is a fallacious move. So how do we proceed on this issue?
Indeed, the only foundation that could ever be reached is the metaphysical reduction base, the most fundamental level of reality that explains everything else by means of itself, but which itself cannot be explained. As should be immediately clear, this necessitates that we take to be metaphysically fundamental that which is epistemically fundamental; that which comes even before meaning, thought, and the “I” of the self. In other words, what Descartes was looking for with the “Cogito” but failed to reach.
The only possibility is consciousness, in the sense of contentless awareness, or core subjectivity. By definition, it precedes all else. Under idealism, core subjectivity is existence. Because existence is logically prior to anything and everything that exists (or could exist), core subjectivity is also logically prior. Moreover, the choice of reduction base cannot be an arbitrary selection, akin to the foundationalist move of saying, “our explanations have to stop somewhere.” The primitive we choose must actually be inexplicable by means of anything else. As such, it must be unconstrained by relation to anything else.
We have to know it without needing to know anything else in order to know it. Recall what we’ve learned from Hume: for any theory of knowledge to be true, we must already know a priori what reality is, what we are, and how the two interact. Existence itself (consciousness) is the only candidate that meets this requirement. Physical entities, which are known only by, in, and through consciousness, are thus excluded due to their constraining relationship to consciousness, which demands explanation. This rules out all metaphysical theories that take the physical order to be fundamental in any sense.
Thus, idealism must be true, and idealism entails an intentional world.
Evaluating skepticism
Skepticism, a philosophical position questioning the possibility of certain knowledge, emphasizes doubt and uncertainty regarding the foundations of belief (Hume, 1748; Sextus Empiricus, c. 160–210 CE). As we’ve already seen, Hume’s empiricist skepticism, outlined in his “A Treatise of Human Nature,” challenges the traditional notions of causality and induction, arguing that our beliefs in cause-and-effect relationships are not rationally justifiable (Hume, 1748). Sextus Empiricus, a Pyrrhonian skeptic, advocated suspension of judgment in response to conflicting evidence, questioning the possibility of objective certainty (Sextus Empiricus, c. 160–210 CE).
While most skeptics believe in an external material world, Willard Van Orman Quine admits that it is an unjustified belief (Quine, 1951). As for the internal mental world, the skeptic asks what the “self” really is. Is the self computational? Is it determined by neurochemical processes alone? Is it one thing or many things? Is it influenced by other people, and thus can it be said that no self is really one entity? Indeed, current discussions in philosophy of mind often acknowledge that the self is, in a non-trivial sense, illusory. Of course, if core subjectivity (existence) is taken to be the experiencer in the “Cogito” and not the adaptive self, then there is no epistemic problem here, as core subjectivity precedes the self, both metaphysically and logically. Theories like analytic idealism do just that.
More specifically, Quine challenges the traditional distinction between analytic and synthetic statements, and questions the idea of a foundation of knowledge based on observational evidence. He rejects the notion of a strict dichotomy between statements that are true by definition (analytic) and those dependent on empirical evidence (synthetic). He argues that any statement can be revised in the face of new evidence, blurring the supposed boundary between the two categories. This challenges the foundationalist idea of certain, indubitable starting points for knowledge.
Furthermore, Quine advocates for the coherentist and holistic approach to language and meaning. He introduces the idea of the “web of belief,” where all beliefs are interconnected, and the revision of one belief may entail changes throughout the entire system (Quine, 1951). This holistic perspective undermines the idea of isolated foundational beliefs and questions the possibility of secure foundations for knowledge. Of course, this perspective faces the same challenges to coherentism that we’ve already referenced, namely that it renders all beliefs in the web foundational.
Ludwig Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, particularly expounded in “Philosophical Investigations,” introduces the concept of language games and challenges traditional philosophical problems as misunderstandings of language (Wittgenstein, 1953). Wittgenstein is skeptical of the idea that philosophical problems can be solved through a detached analysis of language, emphasizing the importance of the context in which language is used. By shifting the focus to the diverse language games played in various contexts, Wittgenstein challenges the possibility of providing universally applicable philosophical solutions.
While Bertrand Russell initially embraced a logical atomist view that aimed at reducing complex propositions to simple atomic facts, his later works, such as “Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits,” reveal a more skeptical stance (Russell, 1948). Russell acknowledges the limits of human knowledge and expresses uncertainty about the ultimate nature of reality. Russell’s skepticism emerges from the acknowledgment that our conceptual frameworks may be inherently limited in capturing the ultimate nature of reality. He questions the adequacy of language and logic in representing the complexity of the external world, suggesting that our understanding may always fall short of grasping the complete truth. This skepticism about language also echoed concerns about the potential for ambiguity and imprecision in the expression of philosophical ideas.
Chief among the problems presented by skeptics is the very same problem of induction: those who espouse psychological epistemologies cannot justify making inductive generalizations, since no number of specific instances of an event can justify a universal description of that event. Russell went so far as to say, “What these arguments prove–and I do not think the proof can be controverted–is that induction is an independent logical principle, incapable of being inferred either from experience or from other logical principles, and that without this principle science is impossible” (Russell, 1945). Indeed, without inductive generalizations, scientific conclusions are rendered meaningless.
Karl Popper’s philosophy, known as critical rationalism, addresses this challenge of skepticism regarding inductive generalizations by introducing the concept of falsification. In contrast to the traditional inductive approach, which seeks to establish generalizations based on observed instances, Popper argues for the falsifiability criterion as a way to demarcate scientific theories from non-scientific ones.
He proposes a solution through the principle of falsifiability, asserting that scientific theories should be formulated in a way that makes them vulnerable to empirical refutation (Popper, 1959). According to Popper, a theory is scientific if it can be subjected to empirical tests that, if unsuccessful, would refute or falsify the theory. In contrast to the traditional inductive approach, Popper’s philosophy emphasizes that scientific progress is not based on verifying theories but on rigorous attempts to falsify them (Popper, 1959). The role of falsification becomes crucial in eliminating the need for inductive generalizations as the basis for scientific knowledge.
Popper’s approach addresses the skeptical challenge by acknowledging the inherent uncertainty in scientific endeavors. Rather than claiming absolute certainty through induction, Popper emphasizes the openness of scientific theories to empirical testing and potential falsification (Popper, 1959). This mitigates skepticism associated with the impossibility of establishing certain generalizations through induction. Moreover, Popper introduces an evolutionary character to scientific knowledge. Theories that survive falsification attempts contribute to the cumulative growth of scientific understanding. This dynamic process allows for the continual improvement and modification of scientific theories in response to new evidence.
Indeed, all of this makes sense on the surface, and so it is no surprise that the scientific community, a majority of whom over the last century have espoused the accidental worldview of physicalism, has embraced Popper’s falsifiability criterion.
Unfortunately, falsification does precisely nothing to solve the problem. It precludes the possibility of science finding positively justified propositions, instead favoring guesses that can only be corroborated by a failure to falsify them. The result is that no belief can ever be justified in science, since we can always find another secondary hypothesis to support any primary hypothesis that has been falsified. As such, science becomes a rescue operation rather than the evolutionary, survival-of-the-fittest bloodbath that Popper may have intended. The best theories do not survive while the worst theories perish. Rather, since no theory is ever justified, weak theories are permitted to live, so long as the scientists who favor them can rally consensus for secondary hypotheses and resuscitate them. This process is, naturally, highly susceptible to the kinds of biases, group-think, and regression pointed out by Thomas Kuhn (1962).
In short, science requires universal propositions in order for its theories to be epistemically justified. Therefore, science cannot function under an accidental worldview that denies universal truths.
Even worse, an accidental worldview cannot justify belief in the uniformity of nature, another requirement of science. For the skeptic can only argue that the future will be like the past if he already knows that the future will be like the past, which of course begs the question. As Russell put it, “We have experience of past futures, but not of future futures, and the question is: Will future futures resemble past futures? This question is not to be answered by an argument, which starts from past futures alone. We have therefore still to seek some principle which shall enable us to know that the future will follow the same laws as the past” (Russell, 1912).
Without a justification of this belief, scientific generalizations are impossible. And, if induction and the uniformity of nature are both unjustified, then so too is deductive reasoning.
But the problem of logic is perhaps the gravest for the accidental worldview, as skepticism about logic undermines the very structure of mind itself. A physicalist gives no ontic existence to logic over and above neurochemical processes, and so logic is reduced to a mere social or psychological convention. But this makes logic arbitrary, and thus the physicalist’s use of logic to argue for their worldview is unjustified.
Simply put, physicalism considers all of the mental entities that it must presuppose to be arbitrary, man-made conventions, and nothing over and above accidental physical events. As such, physicalism cannot justify logic, reason, meaning, knowledge, or indeed existence itself. If physicalism were metaphysically true, reality would be utterly absurd. As such, physicalism is false; indeed, it is nothing more than a superstitious belief system that alleviates the fear of an unpleasant afterlife by promising non-existence, which is itself an absurd belief that an accidental worldview cannot justify.
A notable challenge for skepticism is the paradox it encounters. If skepticism claims that we cannot have certain knowledge, the assertion itself becomes a claim to knowledge, creating an inherent contradiction. This paradox highlights the difficulty of maintaining a consistently skeptical position. Skepticism tends to focus on the limitations and challenges to knowledge but often struggles to provide a constructive epistemological framework. Without a positive account of how knowledge is possible, skepticism leaves an intellectual vacuum without a basis for meaningful inquiry.
No accidental worldview can justify the beliefs that it must presuppose.
Where can we go from here? We can only conclude that, if we view the world as accidental, then logic, reason, knowledge, meaning, and existence itself are all precluded. If the accidental worldviews are true, we have no foundation; to choose such a worldview is to embrace absolute absurdity (itself a universal claim, and thus falling prey to radical skepticism) and a resulting value nihilism, which is self-refuting on its face. Or, we can abandon the accidental worldviews. Instead, we can embrace the intentional worldview that is idealism. The goal of this paper is not to refute logic, induction, deduction, or any of these other concepts. Rather, it is to refute physicalism, dualism, and panpsychism (especially physicalism) by pointing out the absurd conclusions to which they lead.
The academy has chosen to embrace nihilism in order to preserve the accidental worldview of physicalism. They have followed the Nietzschean route and become skeptics of any objective truths, adopting subjectivism, relativism, and post-modernism, none of which can justify their beliefs and all of which appeal to a sense of pragmatic utility in place of truth.
Evaluating pragmatism
Pragmatism, a philosophical tradition that emerged in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, offers a distinctive approach to knowledge that focuses on the practical consequences of beliefs rather than their abstract truth or correspondence to reality. Pragmatists, such as Charles Sanders Peirce, William James, and John Dewey, emphasize the functional and instrumental aspects of belief systems.
Pragmatism challenges traditional notions of truth by foregrounding the practical consequences of beliefs. According to Peirce, the truth of a proposition lies in its practical efficacy and in its ability to produce favorable consequences when applied (Peirce, 1877). William James, a prominent pragmatist, introduced the concept of the “will to believe.” In his essay by the same name, James argues that in situations where evidence is insufficient, individuals have the right to choose to believe in a proposition if it has positive practical implications (James, 1896).
Pragmatism offers an anti-skeptical stance by emphasizing the role of action and experimentation in validating beliefs. John Dewey, a leading pragmatist, developed an action-oriented philosophy that views inquiry and knowledge as tools for problem-solving and practical improvement (Dewey, 1938). In the realm of science, pragmatism manifests as instrumentalism—a view associated with figures like Percy Bridgman and John Dewey. Instrumentalists argue that scientific theories should be regarded as tools for prediction and problem-solving rather than as true representations of an objective reality (Bridgman, 1927).
Pragmatism rejects absolutism and the search for absolute, unchanging truths. Instead, it promotes a contextual and flexible understanding of knowledge that evolves in response to changing circumstances and human needs. In short, utility has become a substitute for truth.
Pragmatist Richard Rorty makes this conclusion clear: “Truth is a property of sentences, since sentences are dependent for their existence upon vocabularies, and since vocabularies are made by human beings, so are truths” (Rorty, 1989).
For the pragmatist, there is no need for a sentence to correspond with reality in order for it to be true, and so no need for us to determine what kind of reality we are describing. This philosophy serves as its own rebuttal, as it blatantly rejects any sense of objective knowledge and normative description. It is a case of society surrendering to absurdity, as the worldview rejects all that it necessarily presupposes. Pragmatism fails because it requires an objective criterion for determining what utility is, which goals should be pursued, and what constitutes an agent that could pursue a pragmatic goal. All of that must come before any application of science for pragmatic ends. However, pragmatism denies objective criteria altogether.
Pragmatists have responded to this critique by attempting to naturalize utility, thereby relativizing it in the process. Quine’s naturalization project involves integrating epistemology with psychology. He argues that the study of human behavior, including linguistic behavior, is crucial for understanding how knowledge is acquired and revised. The emphasis is on empirical investigation into the psychological mechanisms underlying belief formation and change.
Quine’s naturalized epistemology extends to an evolutionary perspective. He explores the idea that our cognitive capacities, including our ways of acquiring knowledge, have evolved over time (Quine, 1975). Evolutionary considerations become integral to understanding the adaptive functions of knowledge acquisition in human survival.
Jean Piaget, a developmental psychologist and philosopher, contributed to naturalizing epistemology by focusing on the developmental stages of cognitive structures in children (Piaget, 1950). Piaget’s constructivist approach posits that knowledge is actively constructed by individuals through interactions with their environment. Piaget’s emphasis on developmental psychology aligns with a naturalistic approach, as he seeks to explain the origins and progression of knowledge in terms of psychological processes. The stages of cognitive development represent natural milestones in the maturation of epistemic abilities.
Piaget introduces the concept of equilibration, emphasizing the drive toward cognitive equilibrium as individuals assimilate new information into existing cognitive structures (Piaget, 1977). The process of adaptation and equilibration reflects a naturalistic understanding of how individuals adapt their knowledge to better fit their environment.
Both Quine and Piaget challenge the notion of objective epistemic criteria. Quine’s holistic approach blurs the distinction between objective and subjective elements of belief, while Piaget’s focus on developmental psychology highlights the subjectivity inherent in knowledge construction. The criteria for evaluating knowledge are seen as dynamic and context-dependent.
Incidentally, Marxism follows if you ascribe agency to economic classes, and post-modernism follows if you do the same with identity groups and social classes. With this, we have now reached the present day. These represent the current mainstream paradigms that seek to account for epistemic justification under an accidental worldview.
The problem is that all of these philosophies also make presuppositions, including logic, truth values, knowledge, meaning, and existence. None of those presupposed entities can be accounted for by means of psychology or evolution alone, since psychology and evolution also make those same presuppositions.
In short, adherents of accidental worldviews are forced to conclude that all worldviews and their presuppositions are social constructs, based on subjective, psychological stories rather than on objective universals. The contradiction and the defeater should be immediately evident; if that conclusion is correct, then the accidental worldview itself is also a social construct, nothing more than an arbitrary fideism. As such, no one is justified in believing an accidental worldview, and so physicalism, dualism, and panpsychism are all refuted outright.
Indeed, no worldview that claims reality to be accidental–and thus no worldview that takes the physical order to be fundamental–can account for these presuppositions, since they deny the existence of those entities that they presuppose. Only idealism offers an account of its presuppositions.
Evaluating idealism
How and why does idealism accomplish what the other metaphysical theories cannot? How does an intentional worldview avoid the problems of the various accidental worldviews? It comes down to idealism’s choice of reduction base, as already referenced.
Epistemically speaking, core subjectivity is fundamental. It is the ground state of existence for any experiencing subject. It needs no further explanation, and therefore requires no justifying beliefs, because anything and everything else is an object of this core subject. All explanations really do stop there, because in a state of pure consciousness, during which one simply is core subjectivity, there are no mental contents which require explanation. Indeed, all contents that could ever populate the mind always arise within and by means of core subjectivity.
Idealism takes core subjectivity to be metaphysically fundamental, asserting that reality is an absolute core subject. It is existence at large, and finite minds are microcosms of this macrocosm of fundamental mind. As such, there is an isomorphism between the structural and logical properties of reality and the finite mind, ensuring that they are inductively coupled. That structure can be described as our fundamental concept (existence), fundamental logic (binary logic), and the first bit of information that we cognize about any given object.
First, the concept; you cannot consider what something is, why something is, how something is, or what it does, unless you first understand that it is. As such, the subject only accesses objects through their mutual existence, which makes existence the fundamental concept. Therefore, since idealism takes core subjectivity to be metaphysically fundamental in addition to epistemically fundamental, the idealist can justify belief in existence, a universal which idealism presupposes.
Second, existence can be expressed using binary logic, in which existence = TRUE (1) and non-existence = FALSE (0). This establishes binary logic as the fundamental logic, and also gives us the first bit of information that we cognize about any object (1, corresponding to its existence). For when one understands the existence of an object, this binary logic structures that understanding. Importantly, this applies to all other forms of logic, which are ultimately derived from this binary logic. For example, you can’t consider anything about, say, symbolic logic unless you first understand that symbolic logic exists (TRUE) and does not not exist (NOT FALSE). Therefore (again), since idealism takes core subjectivity to be metaphysically fundamental in addition to epistemically fundamental, the idealist can justify belief in logic, another universal which idealism presupposes. Along with logic come reason, truth, and other universals, all of which idealism can account for via the isomorphism at the fundamental levels of mind-at-large and the finite mind. Intelligibility is ensured because the fundamental logic structures the information that is communicated between reality and the finite mind. The information thereby conforms to the finite mind’s accepting syntax. Due to this, knowledge is justified as well.
Formulated this way, idealism answers the challenge of Hume: for any theory of knowledge to be true (the intentional worldview), we must already know a priori what reality is (consciousness/existence), what we are (consciousness/existence), and how the two interact (isomorphic syntax). Therefore, an idealist is justified in believing in knowledge, reason, logic, meaning, truth, and existence itself.
Conclusion
In examining the diverse philosophical perspectives presented, the question of the intelligibility of reality emerges as a central concern. Idealism, positing consciousness as fundamental, emerges as the only framework that renders reality intelligible. This conclusion is drawn from the intricate interplay between metaphysics, epistemology, and the nature of truth.
For reality to be intelligible, it must possess an intrinsic nature that aligns with the structure of our own consciousness. The most fundamental level of reality must be isomorphic to the inherent structures of human cognition. Idealism stands out as the philosophical position that best accommodates this requirement. By placing consciousness at the fundamental level, idealism ensures that reality is not accidental occurrence, but intentional.
The meaningfulness of truth is contingent upon the intentional nature of reality. Idealism posits that consciousness, defined herein as core subjectivity, is existence itself. In such a worldview, reality becomes imbued with purpose, direction, and inherent meaning. This intentional structure aligns with our capacity for understanding and navigating the world, providing a coherent foundation for knowledge, reason, logic, and meaning. Contrasting with accidental worldviews, where reality arises by chance and lacks inherent purpose, idealism establishes a connection between the finite human mind and the fundamental mind of reality. This intentional alignment signifies a departure from arbitrary and undefined constructs, offering a framework where knowledge is not only possible but is intrinsically intertwined with the intentional structure of the world.
As we have seen, the choice becomes stark: either embrace idealism and a reality that is intentional and meaningful, or face the utter absurdity of value nihilism.
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