Introduction

Current studies of consciousness present a profound challenge known as the “hard problem of consciousness.” This elusive issue pertains to the nature of subjective experience and the relationship between consciousness and the physical world. Western philosophy and science have traditionally approached this problem by assuming a physicalist worldview, treating consciousness as an emergent property of complex physical processes. However, this paper argues that the assumptions made within Western frameworks have inadvertently led to the creation of the hard problem of consciousness, which, upon closer examination, reveals itself as an issue of flawed logic rather than an intrinsic enigma.

More specifically, Western philosophy and science have predominantly embraced a reductionist perspective, assuming that consciousness can be fully explained through the physical workings of the brain (Dennett, 1991). This reductionist approach is rooted in the assumption that all phenomena, including consciousness, can ultimately be reduced to their fundamental physical constituents (Churchland, 1988). Consequently, consciousness is seen as an emergent property arising from the complexity of neuronal interactions (Crick & Koch, 1990).

Those assumptions of reductionist physicalism inevitably lead to the hard problem of consciousness: there is no way, even in principle, that purely qualitative phenomenal consciousness can be reduced to or explained by purely quantitative physical entities (Chalmers, 1995). This perspective contends that even if we were to understand every physical mechanism underlying consciousness, the question of why and how these physical processes give rise to subjective experience remains unresolved. This creates an apparent explanatory gap that poses a profound challenge for Western frameworks and is insoluble, given the definitions of consciousness and physical entities under the current physicalist paradigm. 

However, this paper argues that the hard problem of consciousness is, in essence, an issue of flawed logic arising from religion’s lasting dualistic influence on Western philosophy. In short, even physicalism, which claims to be monist, still makes dualistic assumptions that are not easy for the Western mind to spot and correct. By shedding that lingering dualism, Western philosophy (and the science it influences) can explore alternative frameworks that offer novel perspectives on the mind and consciousness.

Once we discard those original assumptions and explore alternative perspectives, we may find new ways to explain the physical and consciousness (object and subject) in relation to each other. 

Furthermore, this paper will explicate premises and principles required for a logically coherent reality-theoretic (as in, the discipline of “reality theory”) framework, so as to:

• Identify where Western physicalism has deviated from coherence.
• Rigorously argue for a logical framework within which scientific theories, such as those of consciousness, can be interpreted. 
• Provide an ontology that delivers greater logical coherence, internal consistency, explanatory power, empirical support, parsimony, and meaning than does physicalism. 

The hard problem of consciousness

Phenomenal consciousness encompasses the raw subjective experience of being aware that accompanies and underlies mental activities, such as sensations, perceptions, emotions, and thoughts. It is characterized by qualia, which are the qualities of subjective experience that cannot be conveyed or fully captured through objective descriptions (Chalmers, 1995). For example, the subjective experience of seeing the color red cannot be fully explained by any physical description, as it entails a subjective “what it is like” aspect that lies beyond objective analysis.

Reductionism is a philosophical approach that seeks to explain complex phenomena by reducing them to their constituent parts and their interactions (Kim, 1998). However, when it comes to consciousness, reductionist attempts encounter significant challenges. This is because consciousness possesses unique qualitative properties that are inherently irreducible to the quantitative properties of physical systems (Chalmers, 1996). Qualitative properties, such as the subjective experience of pain or the taste of chocolate, cannot be captured by simply analyzing physical states or processes.

Indeed, despite a plethora of advances in neuroscience, we still do not have a single scientific theory of even a single conscious experience. We have achieved more sophisticated mapping of the neuronal correlates of consciousness (NCCs), but these correlations do not give us insight into any potential causal relationship between the physical and the mental (Hoffman, 2019). For instance, the empirical data available is fully consistent with a relationship between the brain and consciousness similar to that between fire and combustion, wherein the former is the perceptual image of the latter, not the cause of the latter. 

The hard problem of consciousness emerges from the “explanatory gap” between the subjective experience and the physical processes of the brain (Levine, 1983). This gap reflects the inherent difficulty of bridging the divide between phenomenal consciousness and its physical underpinnings. Even if we were to understand all the neurophysiological processes associated with consciousness, there remains an explanatory gap regarding why and how these processes give rise to subjective experience.

The insoluble hard problem suggests that consciousness possesses an intrinsic nature that eludes reductionist explanations (Chalmers, 1995). It implies that there is a subjective aspect of consciousness that cannot be reduced to or explained by physical properties alone (Nagel, 1974). This subjective aspect, or qualia, cannot be quantified or fully grasped through objective analysis.

However, there are good arguments that the hard problem of consciousness is not a “real” problem, but rather an artifact of the logical incoherence of our current mainstream paradigm. By following those arguments to their conclusion, and by placing our scientific theories and empirical evidence within a logically coherent reality-theoretic framework, we can reframe the hard problem of consciousness and attempt to dissolve it, rather than solve it. 

Indeed, despite claiming to be a monist theory, physicalism still suffers from an inherent dualism, one that makes it logically incoherent in its current form, and which results in paradoxes that plague disciplines ranging from physics to neuroscience and beyond. The hard problem of consciousness is but one of these contradictions. 

Physicalism is dualism in disguise

Metaphysical physicalism, often referred to simply as “physicalism,” is the philosophical position asserting that everything that exists is ultimately reducible to or supervenes upon physical entities or processes. This perspective contends that the only fundamental reality is the physical world, and all phenomena, including mental states and consciousness, can be explained in terms of the interactions of physical entities. Physicalism is commonly classified as a monist theory due to its assertion of a singular underlying (physical) substance or reality from which all else emerges (Chalmers, 1996).

The main premises of metaphysical physicalism can be summarized as follows:

• Reduction to the Physical: Physicalism asserts that everything, including mental phenomena, can be reduced to or explained by physical entities, their properties, and their interactions (Kim, 1998). This implies that mental states, emotions, thoughts, and consciousness itself are ultimately products of physical processes occurring in the brain.
• Supervenience: Physicalism often emphasizes the concept of supervenience, which means that higher-level properties, such as mental states, depend on and are determined by lower-level physical properties (Horgan & Kriegel, 2007). Mental phenomena supervene upon the physical, implying that any change in mental states must correspond to a change in underlying physical states.
• Causal Closure: Physicalism assumes that the physical world is causally closed, meaning that all causal interactions that occur are entirely explicable in terms of physical causes and effects (Maudlin, 2007). Mental events, though they may appear distinct, are ultimately outcomes of physical causation.

As already stated, physicalism is considered a monist theory due to its assertion of a single underlying reality, the physical world, as the source and explanation of all phenomena. This view seems to contrast with dualism, which asserts the existence of multiple fundamental substances or realities, such as mental and physical substances, and asserts their ontological independence. However, as we’ll see, physicalism contains a hidden dualism that traces its roots back to the origins: materialism.

A brief history of materialism and physicalism

Metaphysical materialism has its origins in ancient Greek philosophy, particularly with thinkers like Democritus and Leucippus, who proposed that reality is fundamentally composed of material particles in motion (La Mettrie, 1748). 

This perspective gained renewed attention during the Enlightenment era, partially as a reaction to the dominance of religious institutions, including the Church, over philosophical and scientific thought. Materialism, as a reaction against religious dogma, aimed to establish a worldview based on empirical observation and natural explanations. In so doing, it deliberately left out of its purview anything having to do with the mind, psychology, or cognition, as the Church still demanded control over this domain and held consciousness hostage by tying it to the concept of the soul (Marcy, 2014). 

As such, materialists acknowledged that their philosophy contained only half of reality within its explanatory scope: the objective world. Studies of the subjective world were abandoned for fear of religious reprisals, such as the burnings of scientists and other atrocities committed by the Church. The materialist philosopher in the 1800s who most clearly expressed the sentiment that materialism was flawed but necessary was Ludwig Büchner. In his work “Force and Matter” (1855), Büchner argued for a form of materialism while also acknowledging its limitations and challenges. He believed that while traditional materialism might have shortcomings, it was still an essential step in moving away from religious control over studies of the natural world. 

In other words, from its very inception, materialism entailed a dualism in the form of a necessary distinction between the objective and subjective domains. As materialism (and its successor, physicalism) gained mainstream acceptance in the 1800s, these philosophies became entwined with the scientific intelligentsia. Indeed, the “materialist worldview” and the “scientific worldview” became synonymous, even though science is metaphysically, ontologically neutral (Kastrup, 2019). The problematic conflation between the “physicalist worldview” and the “scientific worldview” continues to this day.

The transition from metaphysical materialism to metaphysical physicalism was influenced by advancements in both philosophy and science. Philosophers like Büchner argued that mental phenomena were a result of complex physical interactions in the brain, bridging the gap between the material and mental (Büchner, 1855). This shift was further driven by the successes of the physical sciences in explaining natural, objective phenomena. As scientific understanding advanced, the conviction grew that the physical world could offer a comprehensive account of reality, including subjective mental states. This marked a departure from the strict materialism of the past, acknowledging that mental phenomena might have physical underpinnings (Papineau, 2001). 

As such, physicalists claim to have a monist theory, with the subjective supervening on the objective. Any notion of the formerly recognized dualism has since slipped through the cracks of history. 

However, that very split between the subjective and the objective presupposes a kind of dualism that has yet to be explained, and which today takes the form of the hard problem of consciousness. While the terms “subjective” and “objective” are still commonly used in discussions of these matters, the more formalized terminology of the hard problem is “qualitative” and “quantitative”, respectively. That physicalism has so far failed to collapse this duality is a telltale sign that the duality is, in fact, as baked into physicalism as it was into the Church’s theism, which the original materialists sought to rebuke. 

Indeed, the hard problem of consciousness is an “in principle” problem. There is no way for us to ever find empirical evidence sufficient for solving it. For example, if we map the entire brain, such that we can match any conscious experience to a corresponding pattern of brain activity, that would still only provide evidence for a correlative relationship between the qualitative and the quantitative. It would offer no support for the causal relationship demanded by physicalist theories of mind. As an “in principle” problem, the hard problem of consciousness is insoluble (Kastrup, 2019). 

Why might this be? How could this be? For those answers, we must turn to the logic that underlies these theories of reality and consciousness. “In principle” problems such as this one are strong indicators that our thinking is incoherent at a general level, above the domain of any specific empirical theory. To find a way to dissolve the hard problem, we must first address the logical frameworks within which we interpret scientific theories. Furthermore, because we’re debating the nature of our subjectivity, through which we come to know the objective realm, we must grapple with issues of epistemology and intelligibility. 

What is the reduction base?

In reality theory, the concept of the reduction base pertains to the fundamental level of reality that is posited as the underlying basis for all other phenomena in existence. It represents a foundational layer of reality from which more complex entities, properties, and phenomena emerge. The essence of the reduction base lies in the belief that all aspects of reality, whether physical, mental, or abstract, can ultimately be explained by reference to this foundational level (Kim, 1998; Papineua, 2001; Kastrup, 2019). 

One crucial aspect of the reduction base is its role in reductionism, the previously referenced philosophical approach that seeks to explain complex phenomena by breaking them down into simpler, more fundamental components (Kim, 1998). According to reductionism, any phenomenon can be understood by tracing its causes back to the reduction base. This approach has been particularly influential in the natural sciences, where the quest for understanding complex systems often involves analyzing their constituent parts and interactions.

However, a notable challenge arises when considering the question of what constitutes the reduction base itself. While reductionism asserts that everything can be explained by reference to simpler components, it also implies that there must be a foundational level that cannot be further reduced. This foundational level, often referred to as “bedrock reality” or “ultimate reality,” serves as the starting point for the explanatory chain but itself cannot be explained by anything else without encountering an issue of infinite regress.

For example, physicalism claims that the reduction base is, itself, physical. All other aspects of reality, including qualities, would then need to be explainable by means of this physical, quantitative reduction base, which itself cannot be explained further. 

As we’ll see next, it is this choice of reduction base that locks physicalism into duality. Indeed, physical entities can only comprise a logically coherent reduction base in a dualistic (or even pluralistic) theory, but never in a monist system.

A logically coherent reality-theoretic framework

Let’s look at some principles and premises necessary to have a logically coherent reality theory. Along the way, we’ll discover how and where physicalism deviates from these logically necessary components of a coherent framework. As part of this section, I’ll pull from my own work crafting a reality theory. A shorter, less technical version of this material can be found in the essay: “If reality is intelligible, and it must be intelligible, then idealism must be true.”

I refer to the following framework as: The Consciousness-Reality Integration Theory (CRIT). It is so named because it collapses the incoherent dualism inherent to other metaphysical worldviews, including physicalism, and promotes a consciousness-as-fundamental ontology that ensures the intelligibility of reality, a precondition of perception, cognition, science, and philosophy.

Specific credit is due to the following great minds, upon whose ideas this framework is built (included are citations for selections of their works used in formulating the below framework): Dr. Bernardo Kastrup (Kastrup, 2019; 2021), Dr. John Vervaeke (Vervaeke, 2020), Christopher Langan (Langan, 2002; 2022), Dr. John Wheeler (Wheeler, 1989), Thomas Campbell (Campbell, 2007), Alfred North Whitehead (Whitehead, 1978), Dr. Noam Chomsky (Chomsky, 1995), Dr. Iain McGilchrist (McGilchrist, 2009; 2021), Dr. Markus Müller (Müller & Masanes, 2013), Dr. Donald Hoffman (Hoffman, 2019), and Dr. Douglas Hofstadter (Hofstadter, 1979).

Principles and premises of a coherent reality-theoretic framework

1. The Intelligibility Principle. Reality must be intelligible.

Science and philosophy presuppose the intelligibility of reality, for without a “through-line” of intelligibility from reality, to perception, to cognition, to natural languages, and on to formal languages, science and philosophy would not be possible. Theories and models, which are linguistic and algebraic in nature, presuppose the intelligibility of reality. 

It must be noted that humans can generate one-word theories of everything (such as “everything”, “reality”, and “universe”), which is the starting point for extensive theories of everything and, indeed, for human mentation in general. The problems of incompleteness and undecidability enter into the picture at increasing levels of specificity and detail.

The goal, then, is to have a reality theory that is a general enough logical framework to be true (it must be true, if intelligibility is to hold, and intelligibility must hold), and within which all empirical, “incomplete” theories can be interpreted. 

In other words, a reality theory must start from experience and explain how and why perception, cognition,  and natural and formal languages map onto reality, such that reality is intelligible. 

2. The Reality Principle. Reality is, by definition, what exists.

Any real “thing” is “part” of reality. More technically, any real “thing” is a behavior (excitation) of reality. Here, we borrow terminology from quantum field theory in physics, in which all particles are excitations of underlying quantum fields. By definition, nothing except reality exists, because anything else that did exist would be, by default, part of reality. 

3. The Monism Principle. If there is a plurality of real, different things, then reality is, by definition, the set of those real things and of their real differences, which follows from the Reality Principle.

Herein, a “set” is defined in accordance with Georg Cantor’s terminology: A set is a collection of definite, distinguishable objects of perception or thought conceived as a whole. The objects are called elements or members of the set (Cantor, 1895). 

Reality must therefore be monist, because any two or more real things, made distinct by real differences between them, will still be the same by virtue of the fact that they are real. For any two real things and the real difference(s) between them, reality is their ground state of existence. Here again, we borrow terminology from physics.

4. The Self-Determinism Principle. Reality must be self-deterministic, not deterministic or indeterministic.

Determinism fails because it requires an external cause to create/determine reality. For an external cause to determine reality, the determinator itself would have to be real, and would therefore be inside reality by definition, thereby contradicting the premise.

Indeterminism fails because, if an event is completely random, it has no reason to occur and therefore will not occur. Furthermore, an indeterministic reality would lack the structural, functional, and organizational rules (syntax) needed in order to enforce its own consistency. 

However, to be consistent with the principle of sufficient reason, reality must have a cause. Since that cause cannot be external to reality, and since reality’s existence cannot be random, there is only one other candidate for the cause of reality: reality itself. Therefore, reality can only be self-deterministic; it must bring itself into existence, serving simultaneously as cause, effect, and causation in all instances of these. In other words, reality must be a kind of tautology.

5. The Tautological Reality Principle. A true reality theory will, by definition, map onto all of reality in every way, and therefore, constitute a tautology.

For scientific theories, falsifiability is crucial. The process of science sees us compare and contrast observations of “things” to predict their behavior. However, there is nothing to which a true reality theory can be compared or contrasted, and therefore nothing that can falsify it. This is why science can’t answer our questions about universal truths—those truths are, by definition, not locally distinguishable and therefore not replicable and not falsifiable. Scientific theories must, therefore, be interpreted within a generally distributable logical framework before they can help address reality-theoretic questions. Providing such a logical apparatus is one of the goals of this paper. 

Moreover, logical and mathematical theories are not empirically falsifiable, since two-value logic is what validates the concept of falsification, itself. Not only that, but falsifiability is tricky. The theory that there are only black crows can be falsified by finding a crow that isn’t black. However, the theory remains true for a place and time where there are only black crows, constituting an instantiation of the theory, even though the theory is not generally distributable. A true reality theory, by contrast, must generally distribute over all of reality, everywhere and “every-when,” with no exceptions.

By the same token, a true reality theory must be true by virtue of its own logical structure, which entails that the theory be:

• Self-contained: It must provide a comprehensive framework that encompasses both the physical and the metaphysical aspects of reality. It incorporates concepts from mathematics, physics, logic, and philosophy, thereby offering a complete description of reality.
• Self-referential: The theory must contain statements that refer back to itself. A true reality theory must include principles and axioms that establish its own validity within its own logical structure. 

In short, a true reality theory establishes its own truth and encompasses a self-contained, self-referential, and logically consistent framework. Because theories and models are part of reality, a true reality theory must also give an ontology to theories and models, themselves. That ontology must include the respective reality theory, itself, which makes the reality theory, by definition, a self-referential, self-verifying, unfalsifiable tautology.

For instance, the concept of “reality” (represented by the word itself) maps onto everything that exists, including itself, because concepts, like itself, exist. As such, there is an identity relationship, or strong isomorphism, between the concept “reality” and reality itself. This complete identity relationship must hold between any true reality theory and the reality onto which it maps.

6. The Principle of Metalinguistics. Because perception and cognition, from which natural and formal languages are derived, are themselves linguistic (consisting of symbols placed in association with each other, including subject-object and time/tense relationships), and because perception and cognition must be isomorphic to reality to ensure intelligibility, reality can also be described as a language, and its ruleset as a linguistic syntax.

First, for arguments on the linguistic nature of perception and cognition, see Jerry Fodor’s The Language of Thought (1975) and the concept of “mentalese” in cognitive science. Mentalese is the experiential language and the informational structure of mind, including of perception, onto which all natural and formal languages must map. A detailed exploration of that topic is beyond the scope of this work.

Languages carry information, which makes reality an information system. This is consistent with John Wheeler’s “It from bit,” or information theory. Information consists of distinctions, which entail constraints differentiating one thing from another (1s and 0s). Therefore, information is two-value logic, because 1 or 0 translates to TRUE or FALSE. Since theories consist of information, theories supervene on two-value logic. It is this fact that gives science the concept of falsifiability, which it takes as a required property of all good empirical theories. For all empirical theories about locally distinguishable things must have a truth value grounded in two-value logic in order to be meaningful and operational. 

Since a true reality theory has an identity relationship to the reality onto which it maps, reality must also supervene on two-value logic as soon as it is constrained by existence. In other words, reality may start as a ground state of unconstrained potential. Here again, we borrow terminology from physics (specifically, the idea of quantum foam). But once any “thing” exists, it adopts an existence (TRUE) vs. non-existence (FALSE). 

As such, as soon as something exists, information and two-value logic come along for the ride. So too does the concept of being, which is the fundamental concept upon which all other concepts supervene. For you cannot conceptualize any thing that is unless you first conceptualize being/existence at large. 

Reality is consistent (see The Isomorphism Principle), and consistency is a two-value logic concept with the tautologies (TRUE or FALSE) and NOT(TRUE and FALSE). Since reality, by definition, contains all existence, it necessarily contains all truths. Its consistency implies that it contains no falsehoods, since a falsehood would contradict the truth corresponding to its negation. 

As such, two-value logic is the distributed syntax of reality. That syntax is primal, because if it wasn’t, a deeper syntax would be needed. Reality is all that exists, so it must be self-configuring. It can’t have an external syntax determining it, as we’ve already discussed in the Self-Determinism Principle. 

Thus, two-value logic serves as the foundational framework for all forms of logic due to its alignment with the fundamental distinction of existence vs. non-existence. The binary nature of propositions, the logical connectives, and even more complex logical systems like predicate logic can trace their origins back to this binary foundation, making two-value logic the fundamental principle in all logical reasoning. 

As Charles Peirce puts it: “A thing without oppositions ipso facto does not exist. Existence lies in opposition.” – Charles Sanders Peirce (1931).

Logical connectives, such as AND, OR, NOT, IMPLIES, are used to build complex propositions. These connectives operate on the binary truth values of the simpler propositions they combine. Just as propositions are rooted in existence/non-existence, so too are the logical operations built upon the binary foundation provided by two-value logic.

Variables, predicates, and quantifiers introduce complexity, but they remain rooted in the basic distinction of existence/non-existence. For instance, predicate logic introduces quantifiers like ∀ (for all) and ∃ (there exists). Even when dealing with the assertion that something exists (e.g., “There exists a red apple”), this claim is ultimately reducible to a binary proposition: either the red apple exists (TRUE) or it does not (FALSE), 1 or 0.

Moreover, a neuron is either firing or it’s not (1 or 0), corresponding to the truth values of two-value logic. Since a neuron is a “brain quantum,” and since neurons conform to two-value logic, then the brain as a whole must conform to two-value logic. As such, nothing that can’t be expressed using two-value logic can be formulated by the brain/mind (Langan, 2022). 

Therefore, since all of our logic and our access to reality are phenomenal (mental) in nature, reality must conform to two-value logic if reality is to be intelligible (and it must be intelligible, due to The Intelligibility Principle). All other logics must then supervene upon two-value logic.

As such: consistent = TRUE = exists = 1. 

By the same token: unconstrained = FALSE = does not exist = 0. 

This also means that any parameters of theories that we don’t yet know (such as in scientific theories) will have to conform to the same reality syntax and be instantiations thereof, because for them to be added to a theory in the future, they must be intelligible. Without the reality syntax we’ve identified thus far, reality could not be intelligible, and science would be impossible. In other words, if a given theory does not conform with the reality-theoretic framework explained herein, that theory must be false. If it were true, then reality would not be intelligible, and reality must be intelligible for science and philosophy to be possible. 

Consciousness plays a pivotal role in the processing, encoding, and decoding of information. It follows that a reality composed of information necessitates the presence of conscious observers to make sense of it, thereby providing the semantics of reality, coupled to the organizing syntax. We’ll explore the nature and role of consciousness in future principles, so remember this point. 

This language of reality can be, to an extent, formalized with the following expression:

R = L_I | L_E = (Σ = {A_Qual, A_Quant}, Γ, S_Σ)

In the above, R represents reality, as described by the previous principles in this paper as self-contained. Its intrinsic linguistic structure has two aspects represented by L_I and L_E. L_I represents the intensional aspect of reality, while L_E represents the extensional aspect of reality. Intension and extension are concepts used in logic, linguistics, and philosophy to describe and differentiate the meanings of terms or concepts.

Intension refers to the internal content or characteristics that define a concept or term. It encompasses the specific attributes, qualities, or properties that are associated with a concept. Intension is concerned with the “what” and “how” of a concept, detailing its essential characteristics.

For example, consider the concept of a “triangle.” The intension of the term “triangle” includes properties like having three sides, three angles, and the sum of its angles equaling 180 degrees. These characteristics define what a triangle is.

Extension, on the other hand, refers to the set of actual objects or individuals that fall under a particular concept or term. It is concerned with the “which” or “who” of a concept, indicating the specific instances or members of the category defined by that concept.

Continuing with the example of a “triangle,” the extension of the term would consist of all the actual triangles in the world. This includes specific instances of triangles such as equilateral triangles, isosceles triangles, right triangles, and so on.

In this context, the intensional aspect of reality delves into the fundamental properties that define the nature of existence, while the extensional aspect includes the vast array of entities, events, and phenomena that instantiate those properties, much the way that written words on a page are extensional instantiations of intensional grammatical properties of a given language. 

Put in more detail, Σ is the signature of the language of reality. In the context of formal language theory and computer science, the term “signature” typically refers to a set of symbols, operators, and rules that define the syntax and structure of a formal language. Signatures are used to describe the building blocks of a language and specify how these elements can be combined to create valid expressions or statements within that language. Here, Σ = {A_Qual, A_Quant} follows this standard way of defining a signature, as A_Qual and A_Quant represent the elements that combine to form strings of the language of reality. 

The signature Σ has subsets A_Qual and A_Quant, corresponding to the familiar concepts of the qualitative and quantitative aspects of reality. More commonly, these respectively represent the duality of mind (purely qualitative consciousness) and matter (purely quantitative physicality) that underlies the hard problem of consciousness.  

Specifically, A_Qual represents consciousness. As we’ll see in the forthcoming Idealism Principle, reality is consciousness, and thus A_Qual is more fundamental than A_Quant. Meanwhile, A_Quant represents the physical aspects of reality that arise within consciousness as the representation of the underlying informational data stream that is “read” by a given conscious agent. In other words, the physical world is what the informational content of reality looks like when experienced by consciousness through the process we call perception. 

Finally, Γ represents the structural and organizational ruleset (syntax/grammar) of reality’s language. It is by the recursive application of this ruleset that conscious agents both “read” (perceive) and “write” (render) strings of physical objects, which are extensional instantiations of the intensional properties (syntax) of the language. As such, conscious agents exist both within (as finite minds) and outside of (as what religious traditions call “spirit” or “soul”) what we call the physical world, which in turn amounts to a representational “screen” of perception. A given conscious agent’s complexity (i.e., computational/cognitive abilities and limitations to integrate information) determine its spacetime interface and the physical world that the agent renders for itself. The resulting strings of physical instantiations of Γ are represented in the above formalization by S_Σ.

Importantly, the implications of Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems and Tarski’s Undefinability Theorem apply to bounded formal systems, not to the formal system above, which described reality as a whole. This is because the Intelligibility Principle, the starting point of CRIT, precedes the results of these theorems. By virtue of the Reality and Monism Principles, these theorems are included within reality, and as such, the Intelligibility Principle maps onto them. If their results applied to the formalization of reality itself, thereby undermining the intelligibility of reality, they would in turn undermine their own intelligibility, thus invalidating them anyway. As such, Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems and Tarski’s Undefinability Theorem apply to standard formal systems that describe A_Quant (the physical world), and not to a formal system that goes beyond the level of the physical and into the metaphysical. Because the above expression does exactly that, it can be considered a “meta-formal” system, beyond the purview of the theorems.

Likewise, those theorems are often used to argue against logic, but they are themselves logical constructs whose definitions are based entirely on logical (syntactic) operations. You can’t use undefinability or incompleteness against logic without invalidating undefinability and incompleteness in the process, which then invalidates their usage against logic. Intelligibility relies on two-value logic, so any objection invoking alternative logical systems (which supervene on two-value logic anyway) undermine their own intelligibility as well (Langan, 2018).

In this way, reality is a language that reads, identifies, and writes itself on all levels. The above is based on Chris Langan’s Metaformal System, part of the Cognitive-Theoretic Model of the Universe (Langan, 2002; 2018). Here, my own version of the expression is meant to translate a similar formal structure into more conventional terminology for the analytic philosophical field. 

In the resulting picture, a non-reductionist worldview is a better description of reality than the reductionist approach, because there are no distinct “things” apart from instantiations of the same syntax (ex: there is only one syntactic photon, as all distinct photons must obey that same syntax, and that syntactic photon is itself part of reality’s syntax). Distinctions between things are nominal, though reductionism is a handy metaphor for quantifying our assumptions and facilitating mathematically formalized theories. For instance, the concept of the reduction base makes discussions of metaphysical theories easier, because it quantifies the number of assumptions that a respective theory makes. 

The subsequent principles elucidate the specifics of how reality reads, identifies, and writes itself. We’ll leave the formalization here and describe this process in more informal philosophical and scientific terms, covering domains ranging from theories of perception to quantum mechanics.

Those topics are complex enough without worrying about formalizations and mathematical notation for our purposes. 

7. The Isomorphism Principle. Reality is intelligible by virtue of the hierarchy consisting of itself and its contents, structured by means of its ruleset/syntax.

Each part of reality contains a description of the whole, in the form of a common set of structural, functional, and organizational rules. The through-line of intelligibility can be described as the logos, and we can think of this common set of structural, functional, and organizational rules as the syntax of reality, as already described in the previous principle. As we’ll see, it is this syntax/logos/ruleset that acts as the through-line of intelligibility across reality’s levels. 

As such, reality’s parts are isomorphic to each other, by virtue of the fact that reality’s syntax is generally distributed over everything that exists. In that way, every real thing is an instantiation of reality’s syntax, and will share a common set of structural, functional, organizational rules with every other real thing. Each real thing in the multiplicity of reality is then unique up to isomorphism in relation to every other real thing, allowing for variety within the consistency. 

This can be compared to the physical laws as they appear to our perception. For example, the Law of Conservation of Momentum applies approximately everywhere in spacetime, but only moving objects instantiate the law. 

These rules (reality’s syntax) allow reality’s parts to consistently interact. The consistency of reality is implied by the stability of perception. Each level can be unique up to isomorphism, allowing for variety in the way reality actualizes, but each level is also constrained by the syntactic structure they must all share.

Importantly, this structure also renders the concept of strong emergence, often suggested by physicalists to be a solution to the hard problem of consciousness, completely incoherent. Strong emergence is the idea that certain properties or phenomena of complex systems cannot be fully explained or predicted solely based on the properties of their individual components. In other words, strong emergence posits that these emergent properties are not reducible to, or explicable by, the properties of the system’s constituent parts, and in fact can share none of the properties of their constituent parts. It is often invoked to explain consciousness under physicalism, as in that case, something purely qualitative (phenomenal consciousness) could emerge from something purely quantitative (physicality) despite not having any quantitative properties. However, if this were the case, there would be no isomorphism between the strongly emerged purely qualitative phenomenon and its constituent, purely quantitative parts. 

In the case of consciousness, if strong emergence were true, reality would be unintelligible to us, since there would be no isomorphism between the physical and the mental, thus violating The Intelligibility Principle–we wouldn’t be able to apprehend reality at all, never mind theorize about it. This would also deepen the dualism between the mental and physical, as strong emergence blatantly acknowledges that there is no way to explain the former from properties of the latter. Accordingly, both the physical and the mental would need to be fundamental to reality, since they would have sets of completely unique properties relative to each other. That is the definition of dualism, and thus defeats the entire purpose and central claim of strong emergentism, which is that consciousness is physical.

The result is that physicalism claims that there is no distinction between mind and matter (it claims to be monist), but then implicitly claims that physicality has ontic priority. But no “substance”, such as physical matter, can exist apart from its properties. Substances instantiate the properties that characterize them. This must be so, since a substance’s properties give it form and distinguish it from other substances. A substance lacking properties could not be apprehended or distinguished from its environment, and properties without a substance would have no instantiation to be apprehended. Therefore, a substance’s properties can’t emerge from it or supervene on it, unless that substance can also be considered to emerge from or supervene on its properties. In the case of the hard problem of consciousness, in order for the property of consciousness to be a function of the physical, the physical would also need to be a function of consciousness. Thus, giving the physical ontic priority over consciousness is incoherent, as is the physicalist worldview that makes this claim. Only non-dual monism (such as idealism) avoids this logical incoherence, whereas any theory that takes the physical as fundamental and consciousness as epiphenomenal inevitably leads to dualism and falls into this trap.

In summary of this principle, reality’s fractal nature, as evidenced by its consistency, creates the through-line of intelligibility that makes reality itself, perception, cognition, and natural and formal languages isomorphic to each other.  

8. The Principle of the Reduction Base. At the “bottom” of any reality theory must be an ontological primitive, beyond which we can’t explain, but which explains everything else by means of itself. 

Concepts are defined by constraints specifying their structure, and structure requires explanation. Consequently, every concept requires explanation except for the reduction base, which itself cannot be explained by means of anything else, by definition. The reduction base is what reality is. Since reality is all that exists, there is nothing else that could exist by which reality could be explained. 

Therefore, the choice of reduction base must have no constraints, and no structure to explain. It must be the ontological ground state.

As a result, the ontological ground state cannot be physical—physical “things” are only ever known as ideas within consciousness and, therefore, are necessarily always constrained by a relationship to consciousness, the medium in which they appear. Because consciousness is epistemically fundamental, we know that it exists without having to reference any other “thing” in order to know that it exists. As such, consciousness always constrains the physical, but the physical does not constrain consciousness. 

This is why physicalism is inherently dualistic and why it encounters the hard problem of consciousness. 

Meanwhile, a theory that starts from consciousness does not encounter an equivalent “hard problem of matter,” though some physicalists will try to establish that dichotomy as a counter argument. However, this is a false dichotomy, because consciousness and physicality are on separate epistemic levels of knowledge. Since a dichotomy requires the same epistemic level for the two respective entities in question, consciousness and physicality are not dichotomous, by definition. The assumption that they are is, too, an artifact of the dualism that is inherent to physicalism and to Western thought since Descartes. 

Similarly, the contents of mind are only ever known via consciousness. Thoughts, emotions, memories, identities, etc. are all fleeting. Therefore, they are not essential to consciousness, but rather, are also excitations of consciousness, just as physical entities are. In other words, objects, be they physical or mental, are always constrained by their relationship to the subject: pure consciousness. You know you’ve reached the subject only when there are no more identifiable constraints, and only pure consciousness fits that description.

This could be described as a dual-aspect monism, in which consciousness is the monad, and mind and information (physicality) are its dual aspects. Put another way, the subject is the monad, while quantitative and qualitative objects are its aspects. Consciousness is epistemically fundamental, which means it is the only “thing” that is unconstrained–it exists without relation to anything else. It is the subject to which all objects relate and are thereby constrained. 

Therefore, the ground state of reality is pure, unconstrained consciousness at the level of nature itself.

To choose any other reduction base would result in an incoherent reality theory. Recall that a true reality theory must have an identity relationship with the reality onto which it maps in every way. Since reality itself cannot be incoherent, neither can its coupled theory. 

If a given theory, such as physicalism, does not conform with the reality-theoretic framework explained herein, that theory must be false. As such, physicalism is false. By contrast, idealism is the metaphysical theory that specifically takes pure consciousness as fundamental. As such, idealism must be the metaphysical extension of a true reality theory, and reality must be pure consciousness. Otherwise, reality would not be intelligible, and it must be intelligible.

9. The Idealism Principle. Consciousness and reality are ultimately inseparable, such that reality is pure consciousness. 

Here and throughout, “consciousness” refers to phenomenal consciousness (the philosophical/neuroscientific term)/awareness and presence (Eastern philosophical terms/“I Am-ness” (Western religious term). It does not refer to meta-consciousness or any of the other cognitive functions, which will be addressed later. 

First of all, our minds are part of reality. Therefore, they are instantiations of reality’s generally distributed syntax. Moreover, because reality is intelligible, it necessarily conforms to the categories of mind (Kant, 1781). On one hand, mind is included in reality by experiential relevance. On the other hand, mind acts as a filter: that which does not conform to mental categories is irrelevant to perception and cognition, and therefore excluded from reality by definition.

Physical/objective and mental/abstract are, fundamentally, the same, with no general distinction, because:

• Consciousness is epistemically fundamental, which means that it is impossible to prove that reality isn’t mental. Therefore, we can’t make an assumption either way.
• Due to the Monism Principle, any difference relation between two real “things”, in this case mind and physicality, reduces to their common medium, reality.

As such, the distinction between quantitative physical entities and qualitative phenomenal entities exists within the medium of reality, which distributes over both quantities and qualities. Therefore, there can be no ontological distinction between “physical” and “mental,” “quantitative” and “qualitative.” 

Once again, this means that dualism is false, by virtue of logical incoherence and a lack of intelligibility. Under dualism, the claim is that reality is made up of physical things, and that our abstract consciousness, a separate ontological entity, interacts with the physical, such that we experience those things. However, if there is a true ontological separation at the bedrock of reality, then there would not be a through-line of intelligibility across that ontological gap, because there would be no generally distributed syntax provided by a shared medium (a dualist who claims otherwise would then be, by definition, a monist instead).

For example, if a photon had only “concrete” existence, it couldn’t map onto an abstract idea of a photon. Since we only access the world via ideas, then a concrete photon wouldn’t exist for us. The through-line of intelligibility would not be present, and so science and philosophy would be impossible. Because the through-line of intelligibility is a product of reality’s fractal, recursive nature, and because such a generally distributable structural, functional organization (syntax) requires monism, reality is unintelligible under dualism, and therefore dualism is false.

A true reality theory must map onto reality everywhere in every way, which means a strong isomorphism (identity relationship) between theory and reality, abstract and concrete, subjective and objective, qualitative and quantitative.

In other words, if something in reality can’t be conceptualized, it might as well not exist. As such, Cartesian dualism is false. The physical and mental are ontically the same. A true reality theory and reality itself are also the same. 

Therefore, reality is a self-perceptual system, at once mind and matter, or akin to solipsism at the level of nature itself and encompassing all other fractal subjects (conscious agents like us). We’ll cover this topic more in the final principle.

If reality is intelligible, and it must be intelligible, then idealism must be true. Reality must be pure consciousness, the ground state of potential within which quantities (physicality) and qualities (mind) both arise together. 

10. The Out of “No-Thing” Principle. Because the ground state of pure consciousness is unconstrained, it is “no-thing,” in which there is infinite potential for “some-thing” to exist.

Because pure consciousness is unstructured, the only possibilities which can actualize from it are those with sufficient internal structure to create and configure themselves. Reality is all that exists, so it must be able to actualize itself from unconstrained potential. This means that it must have a perspective. In other words, reality = consciousness, as we’ve already covered at length. Reality, rather than being deterministic or indeterministic, is self-deterministic. It constrains itself by applying a ruleset to itself in order to create and configure itself. 

The above reasoning resolves the ex nihilo or “something-from-nothing” paradox, which arises when “nothing” is taken to exclude not just “something,” but also the potential for “something.” Because the exclusion of potential is, itself, a constraint, “nothing” in that sense requires its own explanation, and cannot serve as the reduction base for this reason. But when “nothing” is viewed as unconstrained potential (“no-thing”), it can serve as the ground state of potential. Not only that, but “some-thing” then inevitably exists out of it.

As we’ve already seen, reality is an information system (Wheeler’s “It from bit”) because information consists of distinctions in which one thing is syntactically constrained to differ from another. Reality self-configures from potential to information, the etymology of which is “to give form to potential.”

Consciousness gives form to potential…that’s the definition of cognizing information. It can recognize its own existence, which is required in order to apply the ruleset to itself (see next principle). Indeed, consciousness is the only “thing” we know of that can do this. As such, consciousness is self-deterministic and, once again, the only viable candidate for the ground state of reality, with mind as its constrained subjective/abstract modality and the physical as another constrained, objective/concrete modality.

11. The Natural Teleology Principle. To “in-form” itself from its own potential, reality needs a function to distinguish what it is from what it is not; that is, for any “thing” to exist, reality must recognize it as itself. 

This requirement, the Natural Teleology Principle, generalizes the well-known anthropic principle: whereas the anthropic principle (Barrow & Tipler, 1986) asserts that reality must have a form that is compatible with our existence, the Natural Teleology Principle asserts that reality must have a form that “selects” for its own existence.

Because reality is self-contained, it serves as its own selection function. This requirement gives reality a reflexive form whose goal is to self-actualize by recursively applying the same selection function, thus producing a fractal, isomorphic hierarchy of levels. 

This process can be considered a naturalistic telos, or a purpose/direction in which reality is progressing. 

12. The Emergent Complexity Principle. Complexity must emerge from the first binary distinction as a result of the recursive application of this selection process by reality.

In ordinary causation, physical states evolve over time according to laws of nature. But this leaves open the question of where the laws came from. If states depend on laws, what do laws depend on? We need an ontology of laws in addition to the states that evolve by means of them.

Similar to a cellular automaton, reality can be seen as applying its ruleset to itself repeatedly, beginning with the simplest of initial conditions (a single binary distinction–existence vs. non-existence, “some-thing” vs. “no-thing”). In this way, unimaginable complexity evolves from simple initial conditions and a simple ruleset (two-value logic), producing a fractal structure that ensures isomorphism and intelligibility across all levels (Wolfram, 2002; Azarian, 2022). 

This process amounts to cognition in the “mind” of (and that is) reality, and as such, cognition and time are synonymous. For consciousness evolves via the state-transition parameter called cognition, which processes information. Reality evolves along the state-transition parameter called time, which we perceive via observed state changes of information (matter). Both mind and reality are informational systems that arise within pure consciousness, with cognition and time serving as their respective information processing parameters. It follows that cognition and time must be the same state-transition parameter, and the time experienced by any mind at any level of reality must correspond to the information processing happening at that level, consistent with the computational bounds restricting the given mind (Langan, 2002; Wolfram, 2002). 

In other words, time is the function that transforms information. In spacetime, time is what reality’s cognitive function looks like to our perception. We’ll explore this in greater depth in a subsequent principle. 

As finite instantiations of reality’s syntax, we have limited cognition relative to the cognitive power of reality, itself. As such, our perceptual faculties are not comprehensive, but rather provide us with a “dashboard” that retains an isomorphism to the whole, but translates the information into a simpler, lower-entropy language (perception). As a result, we can “read” the language of perception (take in sense data that communicates isomorphic information about reality), process it within our cognition, and then “write” it by acting back upon reality. For more robust argumentation for this model of perception, see Karl Friston’s work. 

One common question that Bernardo Kastrup, the scientist and philosopher behind analytic idealism, often receives in debates and discussions is: why does reality have the properties and laws that it has? Kastrup’s usual reply is something along these lines: to be is to have properties, so reality is what it is and therefore has the properties that it has. While this is true, the reality-theoretic framework laid out herein fleshes out his point. Reality possesses the properties that it does because it evolves its own complexity from its very first distinction, which is necessarily a single binary (existence vs. non-existence, 1 vs. 0, True vs. False). It does so by applying its own ruleset to that simple initial condition. The ruleset, two-value logic, emerges right alongside that first binary distinction as soon as some “thing” exists out of the ground state of “no-thing.” As such, reality’s properties (laws) emerge along with its states (instantiations of the laws), all derived from reality’s recursive application of its ruleset to itself. 

13. The Absolute Infinity Principle. Reality’s ruleset is applied recursively to all possible initial conditions, creating a superposition of all possible instantiations, which ultimately “collapses” into the most stable option for a given observer, based on the observer’s computational limitations.

Because reality is self-contained, its external size and duration are undefined, and it cannot expand in an external sense: it has nothing to expand into, and “no-when” to expand during. 

Rather, reality stratifies inwardly, into a superposition of sequentially related states. New states are formed within the images of previous states. Rather than reality expanding relative to its contents, its contents contract relative to it, and time scales shrink in proportion—an idea outlined in 1933 by Arthur Eddington, and in much greater detail by Christopher M. Langan, who coined the term conspansion in The Cognitive-Theoretic Model of the Universe (2002).

“Conspansion” combines contraction and expansion. As new states form within the previous ones, everything shrinks within its own boundaries along with the measurement metric for spacetime. As such, the contents of reality contract from the global perspective of reality itself. By the same token, reality appears to be expanding from the local perspective of reality’s contents. 

Conspansion entails two phases. The first involves reality describing the next present state by referencing the information it currently holds (past states) and all future and past possibilities existing in superposition. The second phase involves the actualization and physical instantiation of that described present state. From the global perspective of reality as a whole, these phases can be called Descriptive Containment and Topological Containment, respectfully (Langan, 2002). As a result, the material objects in the instantiated physical universe contract into themselves while the boundaries of the universe remain fixed. From this global perspective, the contents of reality seem to contract.

At the local level, those same processes can be called inner expansion and re-quantization. In inner expansion, conscious agents interact and absorb information from each other, creating future states within their individual previous states. In re-quantization, the next physical insantiation of the position and properties of objects appear. From this local perspective, the physical universe seems to be expanding (Langan, 2002). 

Combining both the global and local perspectives gives the term “conspansion”, a concept that helps resolve current paradoxes under the physicalist paradigm, not least of which is the measurement problem of quantum mechanics.

For a visual example of this kind of organization, see Hofstadter’s butterfly (Hofstadter, 1979), in which the fractal levels of the whole expand inward. The whole does not expand outward (it has nothing to expand into beyond the terminal frame of the graph), but the whole would seem to expand outward from the perspective of each successive fractal image that stratifies inwardly.

Each fractal image (level/part of reality) gets its identity from that above it, and also gives its own structure to those below it, in a simultaneously top-down and bottom-up process of actualization (not coincidentally paralleling the brain’s information processing and world modeling processes). 

It is because of this fractal, hierarchical structure that the multiplicity of reality is held in the unity of reality. In other words, every “thing” always exists, even if not physically instantiated, in so far as the potential for it to exist is inherent to reality. For instance, just as all possible words exist within the potential inherent to the syntax of a natural language, even when there is no written instantiation of a given word, all possible “things” exist within the potential inherent to the syntax of reality, even if there is no current physical instantiation of a given thing.

Each fractal, therefore, contains its own infinity of all possibilities, with the whole of all fractals (reality) being absolute infinity (reality, the One, etc). This is consistent with Georg Cantor’s theorem, the theory of infinite sets (Hosch, 2016). 

The selection function of reality alternates between two phases: a superposition phase, in which events produce new possibilities, and a collapse phase, in which possibilities collapse into new events. 

This recursive process occurs at a fixed rate, which can be identified with the speed of light in a vacuum/the upper limit on information traveling (186,000 miles per second), and understood as the rate at which reality creates itself.

In other words, this is how reality “renders” for conscious agents, who are fractal instantiations of reality’s existence. The generally distributed syntax applies to all things and acts like a self-executing program that simulates “things” within itself. But, ultimately, there is just reality and the syntax, which are one and the same. As such, reality is perceived by its fractal levels (conscious agents) as a series of embedded instantiations of the generally distributed syntax.

The superposition of all possible worlds exists as soon as the first distinction (and thus two-value logic and information) emerges from pure consciousness. At that point, computation exists and all possible rule sets can be applied to all possible initial conditions (Wolfram, 2002). To this extent, the many worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics can be invoked, though not as a means of salvaging physicalism and physical realism. There are not physical instantiations of every possible universe popping into existence every infinitesimal fraction of a second. Rather, inherent to reality is the potential for infinite possibilities, whether or not they are the one that is instantiated by a given conscious agent. 

Therefore, reality progresses similarly to cellular automata dynamics, starting from one binary distinction (existence vs. non-existence) and then evolving by recursively applying a ruleset to this initial condition. From that simplicity, unimaginable complexity arises (Wolfram, 2002; Campbell, 2007).

14. The Decombination Principle. Making up the unity of reality is a stratification of fractal “alters” (conscious agents) created via a process of dissociation in the one mind of reality. 

Similarly to dissociative identity disorder (DID) in individuals, which typically occurs as a result of trauma and an attempt to heal a highly entropic (disordered) mind (American Psychiatric Association, 2013), global-level dissociation occurs to maximize the rate at which reality creates order from its ground state of potential. In both cases, one host mind splits off into multiple alternate personalities, called alters. These personalities seem to be independent minds, but what really happens is that the host mind creates more finite instantiations of itself within itself. For reality, its alters are the stratified, fractal levels that “in-form” within itself, much akin to this dissociative process at the level of the individual. Each alter is essentially reality experiencing itself from within, via a finite instantiation of pure consciousness. A given alter seems to be independent mind and self, but they are in fact reality’s own being having the experience of selfhood. 

But what of spacetime?

The physical world is a representation of reality, or what the rest of reality looks like from across the dissociative boundaries of these alters (Hoffman, 2019; Kastrup 2019, 2021). It serves as a Markov blanket between our inner and outer states, which means that the physical world is a perceptual interface that simplifies the highly entropic external state into symbols and narratives, leading to, for example, the Gibsonian ecological model of perception.

Life/metabolism is what dissociation looks like from an alter’s perspective. Similarly, the brain is what our minds look like from an alter’s perspective, which is why neuroscience has found only the same correlative relationship between brain activity and awareness as that between fire and combustion, respectively (the former is what the latter looks like, and there is no causation between them).

Death is what re-association looks like, and occurs when the dissociative boundary breaks down either substantially or completely. Decay, deterioration, time, and death itself are artifacts of our perception, the result of the information loss entailed by conscious agents’ simplification of reality into a perceptual interface (see the below commentary on entropy) (Proulx, 2023).

A given alter projects all of spacetime, including the entire past, by applying reality’s self-selection function. A selection is made from the superposed possibilities through einselection, the process by which the most stable informational state survives while fragile quantum superpositions “die off,” amounting to universal Darwinism at the quantum level (Azarian, 2022). A given alter’s computational limitations guide this selection by defining the stability required. One can think of this like a video game world that renders only as much detail as can be handled by the computational bounds of the given platform, in order to satisfy the player’s query of the program (Wolfram, 2002; Campbell, 2003).

Spacetime is constantly rendered by the alters. As such, perception itself is akin to a naturalistic simulation theory, in which consciousness is the computer. Additionally, entropy is not an inherent quality of objective systems. Rather, it is tied to the limits of conscious awareness. An increase in entropy arises from an observer’s inability to fully capture and process information due to the necessary simplification of an infinitely complex reality. In that way, the enigmatic Second Law of Thermodynamics is explainable by consciousness. In other words, conscious agents experience only a subset of reality, and this subset degrades over time due to the inherent loss of information in the filtration process (Proulx, 2023). 

Specifically, alters (conscious agents/observers) are contained within reality and experience it from within. Consequently, they possess a subset of reality’s computational power, leading to computational limits. This limitation implies that even if an observer recognizes a significant portion of a pattern (syntax) and predicts behavior with high accuracy initially, each subsequent computational step leads to a constricted bandwidth. Over time, the overall accuracy approaches zero. Rising entropy in all of its forms is what this information loss looks like on our screen of perception.

Therefore, our perception of the laws of physics (including the Second Law) is relative to our computational, syntactic abilities, suggesting that different levels of ability would result in different laws of physics. Such a difference would be more pronounced between species and between the fractal levels of conscious agents (ex: cells vs. humans), but we could expect variation between members of the same species and level as well (Wolfram, 2002).

For further empirical support of this model of reality and of the mechanism of dissociation, we can look to the dreams of patients with DID. Specifically, in the dream, the alters of the patient share the same “physical” reality in a transpersonally subjective manner. The seemingly physical world that they inhabit is how the mental contents of the host’s mind appear across the alters’ respective dissociative boundaries (Barrett, 1996), paralleling what idealism claims occurs at the level of reality. 

Furthermore, cognition is the specific form of information processing that occurs in a mind. Information processing can therefore be described as “generalized cognition,” defined as the ability that consistently differentiates individuals on computational capacity, regardless of the cognitive task or test (Jensen, 1998). As such, the mental capabilities of a given alter depend on the alter’s structure. Broadly, there are three “levels of reality’s self-cognition”: rendered, dissociated, and global.

The lowest of these levels, rendered, encompasses low-complexity objects such as rocks. These physical objects are cognitive only in a general sense—their molecules interact, thereby processing information—but they are not conscious. 

To this extent, Integrated Information Theory (IIT) provides an explanatory (not ontic) description of information structures that correlate with experience. For example, the mathematically formalized process of exclusion in IIT gives the first rigorous account of dissociation in psychology. Furthermore, “phi” models the structure and dynamics of experiential states as they are in and of themselves, rather than as they appear to our perception. In other words, it allows us to analyze the informational structures in reality (pure consciousness) that we perceive as the physical world. IIT is the first scientific model of Schopenhauer’s Will and Kant’s noumena, as opposed to just the Representation and the phenomena, respectively. Notably, physics is unable to do this, as it is locked into studying the interface of perception. Since the physical is not fundamental, and since consciousness is fundamental, then IIT, as a theory of informational structures in mind that correspond to appearances in perception, provides for our knowledge of reality what physics cannot: a way for science to model the mind of nature.

However, the claim here is not that physical entities have consciousness (the common panpsychist interpretation of IIT). Rather, they are cognitive–they are consciousness, which better fits idealism or dual-aspect monism. When coupled with an idealist metaphysics, IIT informs idealism and idealism integrates IIT into a larger, coherent worldview.

The next level of reality’s self-cognition, which includes humans and the entirety of the biosphere, is that of the dissociatedalters. Alters possess individual and collective creative intelligence. They play the role of connecting the first and third levels. Alters, as subsystems of reality’s being, possess reality’s cognitive and creative capabilities (at a lesser scale). It is this ability that allows them to play their role in conspansion. But the alters are also finite and physically instantiate with bodies that are rendered with the rest of the physical world. Therefore, the dissociated alters unite the descriptive and topological aspects of reality, the purpose traditionally assigned to humanity in various religious traditions’ creation narratives (Pageau, 2018). In this case, all living things play this role of reality creating itself.

The third, most fundamental level of reality’s self-cognition, the global level, is that of reality itself. This level possesses properties that the world’s religions have traditionally attributed to God. It could be argued that our relationship to this level of reality is what religions have attempted to capture through their use of metaphor, ritual, and liturgy.

• Omnipresence: The structural, functional, organizational rules (syntax) of the global level distribute over itself in every way, such that every real “thing” is an instantiation of reality’s syntax.
• Omniscience: All real “things” and the distinctions between them exist within the shared medium of the global level of reality. Since the global level encompasses every possible distinction, it contains all possible information and evolves all possible states of that information via cognition. 
• Omnipotence: All real “things” and the distinctions between them exist within the shared medium of the global level of reality, which also contains all possible state transitions of the information therein. Furthermore, reality is self-deterministic, because there is nothing outside of reality that is real enough to determine it. As such, reality always simultaneously serves as cause, effect, and causation itself. 

Implications for the hard problem of consciousness

The above framework starts from intelligibility and proceeds through a set of premises that logically follow from the fact that reality is intelligible to us. As The Intelligibility Principle states, reality must be intelligible to us, otherwise science and philosophy are impossible. Moreover, it’s unclear why or how we would perceive anything if reality was unintelligible, let alone survive within it. As such, the framework asks the question: “What must reality be, such that it is intelligible?”

As we’ve seen, this has extensive implications for the hard problem of consciousness, as well as answers the meta-problem of consciousness (Chalmers, 2018)–that is, why is it that we believe there is a hard problem of consciousness at all?

Solving the meta-problem of consciousness

Firstly, the hard problem of consciousness is not an intrinsic issue but rather an artifact of the logical inconsistencies within physicalism. The problem arises from attempting to explain subjective, qualitative experiences solely in terms of objective, quantitative physical properties (Chalmers, 1995). That logical incoherence is the root cause of the perceived difficulty in reconciling the mental and the physical.

Secondly, this logical incoherence stems from the attempt of physicalism to “pull the territory from the map”, or explaining consciousness (the territory) from the very framework that arises within it (perceived physicality). Doing so creates an inherent contradiction by treating consciousness as an isolated entity, while also trying to account for its interactions with the physical world (Kastrup, 2019).

Thirdly, if reality is to be intelligible to us (and it must be intelligible to us), consciousness must be considered fundamental. Assuming physical entities as fundamental leads to dualism, which in turn hampers the intelligibility between layers of reality. The interaction problem, often associated with the mind-body dualism, arises due to the difficulty of explaining how fundamentally different entities interact (Chalmers, 1996; Kim, 1998). By placing consciousness at the core of reality, the layers of existence maintain an isomorphism, facilitating comprehensibility and consistency. 

In other words, the hard problem of consciousness is just the interaction problem stated in different words, because physicalism is just dualism stated in different words.

We’ve shown physicalism to be logically incoherent, internally inconsistent, lacking in explanatory power, and failing to achieve either parsimony or a coherent choice of reduction base. Abandon physicalism, and the hard problem of consciousness vanishes. 

In answer to the question, “What must reality be, such that it is intelligible?”, the only logical–and, indeed, tautological–answer that fits within a coherent reality-theoretic logical framework is: consciousness. 

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